SYMBOLCOMMON_NAMEaka. SYNONYMS
win.ccleaner_backdoor (Back to overview)

CCleaner Backdoor

aka: DIRTCLEANER

According to CrowdStrike, this backdoor was discovered embedded in the legitimate, signed version of CCleaner 5.33, and thus constitutes a supply chain attack.

References
2021-10-27MandiantKen Proska, Corey Hildebrandt, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Nathan Brubaker
@online{proska:20211027:portable:437b9c1, author = {Ken Proska and Corey Hildebrandt and Daniel Kapellmann Zafra and Nathan Brubaker}, title = {{Portable Executable File Infecting Malware Is Increasingly Found in OT Networks}}, date = {2021-10-27}, organization = {Mandiant}, url = {https://www.mandiant.com/resources/pe-file-infecting-malware-ot}, language = {English}, urldate = {2021-11-08} } Portable Executable File Infecting Malware Is Increasingly Found in OT Networks
CCleaner Backdoor Floxif neshta Ramnit Sality Virut
2021-10-20Twitter (@lampnout)Lampros Noutsos
@online{noutsos:20211020:persistence:9d0e41d, author = {Lampros Noutsos}, title = {{Persistence and Privilege Escalation on Windows via Print Processors}}, date = {2021-10-20}, organization = {Twitter (@lampnout)}, url = {https://stmxcsr.com/persistence/print-processor.html}, language = {English}, urldate = {2021-11-03} } Persistence and Privilege Escalation on Windows via Print Processors
CCleaner Backdoor
2020-09-08PTSecurityPTSecurity
@techreport{ptsecurity:20200908:shadowpad:2903f45, author = {PTSecurity}, title = {{ShadowPad: new activity from the Winnti group}}, date = {2020-09-08}, institution = {PTSecurity}, url = {https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/pt-esc/winnti-2020-eng.pdf}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-10-08} } ShadowPad: new activity from the Winnti group
CCleaner Backdoor Korlia ShadowPad TypeHash
2020-07-20Risky.bizDaniel Gordon
@online{gordon:20200720:what:b88e81f, author = {Daniel Gordon}, title = {{What even is Winnti?}}, date = {2020-07-20}, organization = {Risky.biz}, url = {https://risky.biz/whatiswinnti/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-08-18} } What even is Winnti?
CCleaner Backdoor Ghost RAT PlugX ZXShell
2020-06-09Kaspersky LabsCostin Raiu
@online{raiu:20200609:looking:3038dce, author = {Costin Raiu}, title = {{Looking at Big Threats Using Code Similarity. Part 1}}, date = {2020-06-09}, organization = {Kaspersky Labs}, url = {https://securelist.com/big-threats-using-code-similarity-part-1/97239/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-08-18} } Looking at Big Threats Using Code Similarity. Part 1
Penquin Turla CCleaner Backdoor EternalPetya Regin WannaCryptor XTunnel
2020SecureworksSecureWorks
@online{secureworks:2020:bronze:4118462, author = {SecureWorks}, title = {{BRONZE ATLAS}}, date = {2020}, organization = {Secureworks}, url = {https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-atlas}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-05-23} } BRONZE ATLAS
Speculoos Winnti ACEHASH CCleaner Backdoor CHINACHOPPER Empire Downloader HTran MimiKatz PlugX Winnti APT41
2018-04-17AvastOndrej Vlcek
@online{vlcek:20180417:recent:a452125, author = {Ondrej Vlcek}, title = {{Recent findings from CCleaner APT investigation reveal that attackers entered the Piriform network via TeamViewer}}, date = {2018-04-17}, organization = {Avast}, url = {https://blog.avast.com/update-ccleaner-attackers-entered-via-teamviewer}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-06} } Recent findings from CCleaner APT investigation reveal that attackers entered the Piriform network via TeamViewer
CCleaner Backdoor
2018-03-08AvastThreat Intelligence Team
@online{team:20180308:new:f825c46, author = {Threat Intelligence Team}, title = {{New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities}}, date = {2018-03-08}, organization = {Avast}, url = {https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-08} } New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-11-10CrowdStrikeKaran Sood
@online{sood:20171110:ccleaner:99ee315, author = {Karan Sood}, title = {{CCleaner Stage 2: In-Depth Analysis of the Payload}}, date = {2017-11-10}, organization = {CrowdStrike}, url = {https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/in-depth-analysis-of-the-ccleaner-backdoor-stage-2-dropper-and-its-payload/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-20} } CCleaner Stage 2: In-Depth Analysis of the Payload
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-10-04CrowdStrikeKaran Sood
@online{sood:20171004:protecting:31b337c, author = {Karan Sood}, title = {{Protecting the Software Supply Chain: Deep Insights into the CCleaner Backdoor}}, date = {2017-10-04}, organization = {CrowdStrike}, url = {https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/protecting-software-supply-chain-deep-insights-ccleaner-backdoor/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-20} } Protecting the Software Supply Chain: Deep Insights into the CCleaner Backdoor
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-10-02IntezerJay Rosenberg
@online{rosenberg:20171002:evidence:187dfce, author = {Jay Rosenberg}, title = {{Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active Part 2: More Ties Uncovered Between CCleaner Hack & Chinese Hackers}}, date = {2017-10-02}, organization = {Intezer}, url = {http://www.intezer.com/evidence-aurora-operation-still-active-part-2-more-ties-uncovered-between-ccleaner-hack-chinese-hackers/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-18} } Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active Part 2: More Ties Uncovered Between CCleaner Hack & Chinese Hackers
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-25AvastThreat Intelligence Team
@online{team:20170925:additional:d65b214, author = {Threat Intelligence Team}, title = {{Additional information regarding the recent CCleaner APT security incident}}, date = {2017-09-25}, organization = {Avast}, url = {https://blog.avast.com/additional-information-regarding-the-recent-ccleaner-apt-security-incident}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-10} } Additional information regarding the recent CCleaner APT security incident
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-21AvastThreat Intelligence Team
@online{team:20170921:avast:c2efbfe, author = {Threat Intelligence Team}, title = {{Avast Threat Labs analysis of CCleaner incident}}, date = {2017-09-21}, organization = {Avast}, url = {https://blog.avast.com/avast-threat-labs-analysis-of-ccleaner-incident}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-08} } Avast Threat Labs analysis of CCleaner incident
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-20IntezerJay Rosenberg
@online{rosenberg:20170920:evidence:4767c7a, author = {Jay Rosenberg}, title = {{Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active: Supply Chain Attack Through CCleaner}}, date = {2017-09-20}, organization = {Intezer}, url = {http://www.intezer.com/evidence-aurora-operation-still-active-supply-chain-attack-through-ccleaner/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-07-10} } Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active: Supply Chain Attack Through CCleaner
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-20Cisco TalosEdmund Brumaghin, Earl Carter, Warren Mercer, Matthew Molyett, Matthew Olney, Paul Rascagnères, Craig Williams
@online{brumaghin:20170920:ccleaner:e034063, author = {Edmund Brumaghin and Earl Carter and Warren Mercer and Matthew Molyett and Matthew Olney and Paul Rascagnères and Craig Williams}, title = {{CCleaner Command and Control Causes Concern}}, date = {2017-09-20}, organization = {Cisco Talos}, url = {http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/ccleaner-c2-concern.html}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-06} } CCleaner Command and Control Causes Concern
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-20AvastVince Steckler, Ondrej Vlcek
@online{steckler:20170920:progress:e464d99, author = {Vince Steckler and Ondrej Vlcek}, title = {{Progress on CCleaner Investigation}}, date = {2017-09-20}, organization = {Avast}, url = {https://blog.avast.com/progress-on-ccleaner-investigation}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-19} } Progress on CCleaner Investigation
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-20WiredAndy Greenberg
@online{greenberg:20170920:ccleaner:3590e9c, author = {Andy Greenberg}, title = {{The CCleaner Malware Fiasco Targeted at Least 18 Specific Tech Firms}}, date = {2017-09-20}, organization = {Wired}, url = {https://www.wired.com/story/ccleaner-malware-targeted-tech-firms}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-16} } The CCleaner Malware Fiasco Targeted at Least 18 Specific Tech Firms
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-19Twitter (@craiu)Costin Raiu
@online{raiu:20170919:shared:2d7f9a4, author = {Costin Raiu}, title = {{Tweet on Shared Code between CCleaner and APT17 Missl backdoor}}, date = {2017-09-19}, organization = {Twitter (@craiu)}, url = {https://twitter.com/craiu/status/910148928796061696}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-13} } Tweet on Shared Code between CCleaner and APT17 Missl backdoor
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-18MorphisecMichael Gorelik
@online{gorelik:20170918:morphisec:501cc93, author = {Michael Gorelik}, title = {{Morphisec Discovers CCleaner Backdoor Saving Millions of Avast Users}}, date = {2017-09-18}, organization = {Morphisec}, url = {http://blog.morphisec.com/morphisec-discovers-ccleaner-backdoor}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-08} } Morphisec Discovers CCleaner Backdoor Saving Millions of Avast Users
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-18Cisco TalosEdmund Brumaghin, Ross Gibb, Warren Mercer, Matthew Molyett, Craig Williams
@online{brumaghin:20170918:ccleanup:5ba0369, author = {Edmund Brumaghin and Ross Gibb and Warren Mercer and Matthew Molyett and Craig Williams}, title = {{CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk}}, date = {2017-09-18}, organization = {Cisco Talos}, url = {http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-08} } CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk
CCleaner Backdoor
Yara Rules
[TLP:WHITE] win_ccleaner_backdoor_auto (20230407 | Detects win.ccleaner_backdoor.)
rule win_ccleaner_backdoor_auto {

    meta:
        author = "Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com"
        date = "2023-03-28"
        version = "1"
        description = "Detects win.ccleaner_backdoor."
        info = "autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator"
        tool = "yara-signator v0.6.0"
        signator_config = "callsandjumps;datarefs;binvalue"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ccleaner_backdoor"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20230328"
        malpedia_hash = "9d2d75cef573c1c2d861f5197df8f563b05a305d"
        malpedia_version = "20230407"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"

    /* DISCLAIMER
     * The strings used in this rule have been automatically selected from the
     * disassembly of memory dumps and unpacked files, using YARA-Signator.
     * The code and documentation is published here:
     * https://github.com/fxb-cocacoding/yara-signator
     * As Malpedia is used as data source, please note that for a given
     * number of families, only single samples are documented.
     * This likely impacts the degree of generalization these rules will offer.
     * Take the described generation method also into consideration when you
     * apply the rules in your use cases and assign them confidence levels.
     */


    strings:
        $sequence_0 = { ff15???????? 8b3d???????? 59 ffd7 }
            // n = 4, score = 200
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   8b3d????????         |                     
            //   59                   | pop                 ecx
            //   ffd7                 | call                edi

        $sequence_1 = { 57 ffd6 50 ff15???????? 8b3d???????? }
            // n = 5, score = 200
            //   57                   | push                edi
            //   ffd6                 | call                esi
            //   50                   | push                eax
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   8b3d????????         |                     

        $sequence_2 = { 750a b857000780 e9???????? e8???????? }
            // n = 4, score = 200
            //   750a                 | jne                 0xc
            //   b857000780           | mov                 eax, 0x80070057
            //   e9????????           |                     
            //   e8????????           |                     

        $sequence_3 = { 8b7d2a f4 188642de95c9 70a4 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   8b7d2a               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ecx]
            //   f4                   | call                dword ptr [eax + 8]
            //   188642de95c9         | dec                 eax
            //   70a4                 | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebx + 0x40]

        $sequence_4 = { 01460c 488b3f 493bfc 0f8554ffffff }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   01460c               | dec                 eax
            //   488b3f               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ecx]
            //   493bfc               | dec                 eax
            //   0f8554ffffff         | sub                 edx, 0x18

        $sequence_5 = { 53 56 57 6a3f 33c0 59 8dbde9feffff }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   53                   | dec                 eax
            //   56                   | lea                 ecx, [ebx + 0x18]
            //   57                   | add                 eax, esi
            //   6a3f                 | test                eax, eax
            //   33c0                 | jg                  0xd
            //   59                   | dec                 eax
            //   8dbde9feffff         | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [edx]

        $sequence_6 = { 53 8d45c8 53 50 8d45e0 }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   53                   | push                ebx
            //   8d45c8               | lea                 eax, [ebp - 0x38]
            //   53                   | push                ebx
            //   50                   | push                eax
            //   8d45e0               | lea                 eax, [ebp - 0x20]

        $sequence_7 = { 013e 33c0 8b16 83c410 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   013e                 | call                edi
            //   33c0                 | push                eax
            //   8b16                 | pop                 ecx
            //   83c410               | call                edi

        $sequence_8 = { 01442424 eb30 8b4508 897518 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   01442424             | xor                 eax, eax
            //   eb30                 | pop                 edi
            //   8b4508               | pop                 esi
            //   897518               | pop                 ebp

        $sequence_9 = { 03c6 4863d0 4c8d0c12 4c8d4718 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   03c6                 | int3                
            //   4863d0               | dec                 eax
            //   4c8d0c12             | mov                 dword ptr [esp + 8], ebx
            //   4c8d4718             | push                edi

        $sequence_10 = { 013d???????? 8b04b5d8970210 0500080000 3bc8 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   013d????????         |                     
            //   8b04b5d8970210       | cmp                 ebx, esp
            //   0500080000           | push                edi
            //   3bc8                 | call                esi

        $sequence_11 = { 012e 33c0 5f 5e 5d }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   012e                 | dec                 eax
            //   33c0                 | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebx + 0x48]
            //   5f                   | add                 eax, esi
            //   5e                   | test                eax, eax
            //   5d                   | jg                  0xd

        $sequence_12 = { 01442454 03d1 294c2450 8b4c2410 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   01442454             | cmp                 ecx, eax
            //   03d1                 | jae                 0x34
            //   294c2450             | mov                 eax, dword ptr [esi*4 + 0x100297d8]
            //   8b4c2410             | add                 eax, 0x800

        $sequence_13 = { ffd3 5e 8bc7 5b 5f }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   ffd3                 | test                eax, eax
            //   5e                   | jg                  0xd
            //   8bc7                 | dec                 eax
            //   5b                   | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [edx]
            //   5f                   | dec                 eax

        $sequence_14 = { 00cc cc 4883ec28 488b11 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   00cc                 | add                 ah, cl
            //   cc                   | int3                
            //   4883ec28             | inc                 eax
            //   488b11               | push                edi

        $sequence_15 = { c0e306 0ac3 83c410 8807 47 ff4d0c 75a2 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   c0e306               | shl                 bl, 6
            //   0ac3                 | or                  al, bl
            //   83c410               | add                 esp, 0x10
            //   8807                 | mov                 byte ptr [edi], al
            //   47                   | inc                 edi
            //   ff4d0c               | dec                 dword ptr [ebp + 0xc]
            //   75a2                 | jne                 0xffffffa4

        $sequence_16 = { 00cc cc 4057 4883ec50 4533db }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   00cc                 | add                 ah, cl
            //   cc                   | int3                
            //   4057                 | inc                 eax
            //   4883ec50             | push                edi
            //   4533db               | dec                 eax

        $sequence_17 = { 03c0 894340 8b7340 418bc4 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   03c0                 | add                 dword ptr [esi + 0xc], eax
            //   894340               | dec                 eax
            //   8b7340               | mov                 edi, dword ptr [edi]
            //   418bc4               | dec                 ecx

        $sequence_18 = { 0fb602 4c 03d5 49 83f810 0f8393010000 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   0fb602               | dec                 eax
            //   4c                   | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ecx]
            //   03d5                 | call                dword ptr [eax + 8]
            //   49                   | dec                 eax
            //   83f810               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebx + 0x28]
            //   0f8393010000         | add                 eax, esi

        $sequence_19 = { 03c6 85c0 7f09 488b0a 488b01 ff5008 488b4b28 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   03c6                 | mov                 eax, esp
            //   85c0                 | add                 eax, eax
            //   7f09                 | mov                 dword ptr [ebx + 0x40], eax
            //   488b0a               | mov                 esi, dword ptr [ebx + 0x40]
            //   488b01               | inc                 ecx
            //   ff5008               | mov                 eax, esp
            //   488b4b28             | dec                 eax

        $sequence_20 = { 7436 8d45e8 50 8d45f8 50 8d45f0 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   7436                 | dec                 esp
            //   8d45e8               | lea                 ecx, [edx + edx]
            //   50                   | dec                 esp
            //   8d45f8               | lea                 eax, [edi + 0x18]
            //   50                   | dec                 eax
            //   8d45f0               | add                 edx, edx

        $sequence_21 = { ff740708 e8???????? 59 b9fe000000 3bc1 7604 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   ff740708             | push                dword ptr [edi + eax + 8]
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   59                   | pop                 ecx
            //   b9fe000000           | mov                 ecx, 0xfe
            //   3bc1                 | cmp                 eax, ecx
            //   7604                 | jbe                 6

        $sequence_22 = { 8b4904 8a11 305103 8b480c 8b4904 8a5101 305102 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   8b4904               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ecx + 4]
            //   8a11                 | mov                 dl, byte ptr [ecx]
            //   305103               | xor                 byte ptr [ecx + 3], dl
            //   8b480c               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [eax + 0xc]
            //   8b4904               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ecx + 4]
            //   8a5101               | mov                 dl, byte ptr [ecx + 1]
            //   305102               | xor                 byte ptr [ecx + 2], dl

        $sequence_23 = { 8b45f8 c1e008 03c7 50 56 e8???????? }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   8b45f8               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 8]
            //   c1e008               | shl                 eax, 8
            //   03c7                 | add                 eax, edi
            //   50                   | push                eax
            //   56                   | push                esi
            //   e8????????           |                     

        $sequence_24 = { 01442418 03c8 8954242c 8b542470 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   01442418             | add                 edx, ebp
            //   03c8                 | dec                 ecx
            //   8954242c             | cmp                 eax, 0x10
            //   8b542470             | jae                 0x1a3

        $sequence_25 = { 01461c 8b542424 85d2 7405 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   01461c               | add                 dword ptr [esi], edi
            //   8b542424             | xor                 eax, eax
            //   85d2                 | mov                 edx, dword ptr [esi]
            //   7405                 | add                 esp, 0x10

        $sequence_26 = { 01cc cc 48895c2408 57 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   01cc                 | lock xadd           dword ptr [edx + 0x10], eax
            //   cc                   | add                 dword ptr [esi + 0xc], eax
            //   48895c2408           | dec                 eax
            //   57                   | mov                 edi, dword ptr [edi]

        $sequence_27 = { 42 83fa39 7ef6 03c1 c6002a c6400121 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   42                   | inc                 edx
            //   83fa39               | cmp                 edx, 0x39
            //   7ef6                 | jle                 0xfffffff8
            //   03c1                 | add                 eax, ecx
            //   c6002a               | mov                 byte ptr [eax], 0x2a
            //   c6400121             | mov                 byte ptr [eax + 1], 0x21

    condition:
        7 of them and filesize < 377856
}
[TLP:WHITE] win_ccleaner_backdoor_w0   (20180301 | No description)
rule win_ccleaner_backdoor_w0 {
    meta:
        author = "Florian Roth"
        reference = "https://goo.gl/puVc9q"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ccleaner_backdoor"
        malpedia_version = "20180301"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-NC-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"
    strings:
        $s1 = "\\spool\\prtprocs\\w32x86\\localspl.dll" fullword ascii
        $s2 = "\\spool\\prtprocs\\x64\\localspl.dll" fullword ascii
        $s3 = "\\msvcrt.dll" fullword ascii
        $s4 = "\\TSMSISrv.dll" fullword ascii
    condition:
        all of them
}
[TLP:WHITE] win_ccleaner_backdoor_w1   (20180301 | No description)
import "pe"

rule win_ccleaner_backdoor_w1 {
    meta:
        author = "Florian Roth"
        reference = "https://goo.gl/puVc9q"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ccleaner_backdoor"
        malpedia_version = "20180301"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-NC-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"
    strings:
        $s1 = "Copyright (c) 2007 - 2011 Symantec Corporation" fullword wide
        $s2 = "\\\\.\\SYMEFA" fullword wide
    condition:
        all of them and pe.number_of_signatures == 0
}
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