SYMBOLCOMMON_NAMEaka. SYNONYMS
win.ccleaner_backdoor (Back to overview)

CCleaner Backdoor

aka: DIRTCLEANER

According to CrowdStrike, this backdoor was discovered embedded in the legitimate, signed version of CCleaner 5.33, and thus constitutes a supply chain attack.

References
2021-10-27MandiantKen Proska, Corey Hildebrandt, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Nathan Brubaker
@online{proska:20211027:portable:437b9c1, author = {Ken Proska and Corey Hildebrandt and Daniel Kapellmann Zafra and Nathan Brubaker}, title = {{Portable Executable File Infecting Malware Is Increasingly Found in OT Networks}}, date = {2021-10-27}, organization = {Mandiant}, url = {https://www.mandiant.com/resources/pe-file-infecting-malware-ot}, language = {English}, urldate = {2021-11-08} } Portable Executable File Infecting Malware Is Increasingly Found in OT Networks
CCleaner Backdoor Floxif neshta Ramnit Sality Virut
2021-10-20Twitter (@lampnout)Lampros Noutsos
@online{noutsos:20211020:persistence:9d0e41d, author = {Lampros Noutsos}, title = {{Persistence and Privilege Escalation on Windows via Print Processors}}, date = {2021-10-20}, organization = {Twitter (@lampnout)}, url = {https://stmxcsr.com/persistence/print-processor.html}, language = {English}, urldate = {2021-11-03} } Persistence and Privilege Escalation on Windows via Print Processors
CCleaner Backdoor
2020-09-08PTSecurityPTSecurity
@techreport{ptsecurity:20200908:shadowpad:2903f45, author = {PTSecurity}, title = {{ShadowPad: new activity from the Winnti group}}, date = {2020-09-08}, institution = {PTSecurity}, url = {https://www.ptsecurity.com/upload/corporate/ww-en/pt-esc/winnti-2020-eng.pdf}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-10-08} } ShadowPad: new activity from the Winnti group
CCleaner Backdoor Korlia ShadowPad TypeHash
2020-07-20Risky.bizDaniel Gordon
@online{gordon:20200720:what:b88e81f, author = {Daniel Gordon}, title = {{What even is Winnti?}}, date = {2020-07-20}, organization = {Risky.biz}, url = {https://risky.biz/whatiswinnti/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-08-18} } What even is Winnti?
CCleaner Backdoor Ghost RAT PlugX ZXShell
2020-06-09Kaspersky LabsCostin Raiu
@online{raiu:20200609:looking:3038dce, author = {Costin Raiu}, title = {{Looking at Big Threats Using Code Similarity. Part 1}}, date = {2020-06-09}, organization = {Kaspersky Labs}, url = {https://securelist.com/big-threats-using-code-similarity-part-1/97239/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-08-18} } Looking at Big Threats Using Code Similarity. Part 1
Penquin Turla CCleaner Backdoor EternalPetya Regin WannaCryptor XTunnel
2020SecureworksSecureWorks
@online{secureworks:2020:bronze:4118462, author = {SecureWorks}, title = {{BRONZE ATLAS}}, date = {2020}, organization = {Secureworks}, url = {https://www.secureworks.com/research/threat-profiles/bronze-atlas}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-05-23} } BRONZE ATLAS
Speculoos Winnti ACEHASH CCleaner Backdoor CHINACHOPPER Empire Downloader HTran MimiKatz PlugX Winnti APT41
2018-04-17AvastOndrej Vlcek
@online{vlcek:20180417:recent:a452125, author = {Ondrej Vlcek}, title = {{Recent findings from CCleaner APT investigation reveal that attackers entered the Piriform network via TeamViewer}}, date = {2018-04-17}, organization = {Avast}, url = {https://blog.avast.com/update-ccleaner-attackers-entered-via-teamviewer}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-06} } Recent findings from CCleaner APT investigation reveal that attackers entered the Piriform network via TeamViewer
CCleaner Backdoor
2018-03-08AvastThreat Intelligence Team
@online{team:20180308:new:f825c46, author = {Threat Intelligence Team}, title = {{New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities}}, date = {2018-03-08}, organization = {Avast}, url = {https://blog.avast.com/new-investigations-in-ccleaner-incident-point-to-a-possible-third-stage-that-had-keylogger-capacities}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-08} } New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-11-10CrowdStrikeKaran Sood
@online{sood:20171110:ccleaner:99ee315, author = {Karan Sood}, title = {{CCleaner Stage 2: In-Depth Analysis of the Payload}}, date = {2017-11-10}, organization = {CrowdStrike}, url = {https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/in-depth-analysis-of-the-ccleaner-backdoor-stage-2-dropper-and-its-payload/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-20} } CCleaner Stage 2: In-Depth Analysis of the Payload
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-10-04CrowdStrikeKaran Sood
@online{sood:20171004:protecting:31b337c, author = {Karan Sood}, title = {{Protecting the Software Supply Chain: Deep Insights into the CCleaner Backdoor}}, date = {2017-10-04}, organization = {CrowdStrike}, url = {https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/protecting-software-supply-chain-deep-insights-ccleaner-backdoor/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-20} } Protecting the Software Supply Chain: Deep Insights into the CCleaner Backdoor
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-10-02IntezerJay Rosenberg
@online{rosenberg:20171002:evidence:187dfce, author = {Jay Rosenberg}, title = {{Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active Part 2: More Ties Uncovered Between CCleaner Hack & Chinese Hackers}}, date = {2017-10-02}, organization = {Intezer}, url = {http://www.intezer.com/evidence-aurora-operation-still-active-part-2-more-ties-uncovered-between-ccleaner-hack-chinese-hackers/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-18} } Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active Part 2: More Ties Uncovered Between CCleaner Hack & Chinese Hackers
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-25AvastThreat Intelligence Team
@online{team:20170925:additional:d65b214, author = {Threat Intelligence Team}, title = {{Additional information regarding the recent CCleaner APT security incident}}, date = {2017-09-25}, organization = {Avast}, url = {https://blog.avast.com/additional-information-regarding-the-recent-ccleaner-apt-security-incident}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-10} } Additional information regarding the recent CCleaner APT security incident
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-21AvastThreat Intelligence Team
@online{team:20170921:avast:c2efbfe, author = {Threat Intelligence Team}, title = {{Avast Threat Labs analysis of CCleaner incident}}, date = {2017-09-21}, organization = {Avast}, url = {https://blog.avast.com/avast-threat-labs-analysis-of-ccleaner-incident}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-08} } Avast Threat Labs analysis of CCleaner incident
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-20IntezerJay Rosenberg
@online{rosenberg:20170920:evidence:4767c7a, author = {Jay Rosenberg}, title = {{Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active: Supply Chain Attack Through CCleaner}}, date = {2017-09-20}, organization = {Intezer}, url = {http://www.intezer.com/evidence-aurora-operation-still-active-supply-chain-attack-through-ccleaner/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-07-10} } Evidence Aurora Operation Still Active: Supply Chain Attack Through CCleaner
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-20Cisco TalosEdmund Brumaghin, Earl Carter, Warren Mercer, Matthew Molyett, Matthew Olney, Paul Rascagnères, Craig Williams
@online{brumaghin:20170920:ccleaner:e034063, author = {Edmund Brumaghin and Earl Carter and Warren Mercer and Matthew Molyett and Matthew Olney and Paul Rascagnères and Craig Williams}, title = {{CCleaner Command and Control Causes Concern}}, date = {2017-09-20}, organization = {Cisco Talos}, url = {http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/ccleaner-c2-concern.html}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-06} } CCleaner Command and Control Causes Concern
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-20AvastVince Steckler, Ondrej Vlcek
@online{steckler:20170920:progress:e464d99, author = {Vince Steckler and Ondrej Vlcek}, title = {{Progress on CCleaner Investigation}}, date = {2017-09-20}, organization = {Avast}, url = {https://blog.avast.com/progress-on-ccleaner-investigation}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-19} } Progress on CCleaner Investigation
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-20WiredAndy Greenberg
@online{greenberg:20170920:ccleaner:3590e9c, author = {Andy Greenberg}, title = {{The CCleaner Malware Fiasco Targeted at Least 18 Specific Tech Firms}}, date = {2017-09-20}, organization = {Wired}, url = {https://www.wired.com/story/ccleaner-malware-targeted-tech-firms}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-12-16} } The CCleaner Malware Fiasco Targeted at Least 18 Specific Tech Firms
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-19Twitter (@craiu)Costin Raiu
@online{raiu:20170919:shared:2d7f9a4, author = {Costin Raiu}, title = {{Tweet on Shared Code between CCleaner and APT17 Missl backdoor}}, date = {2017-09-19}, organization = {Twitter (@craiu)}, url = {https://twitter.com/craiu/status/910148928796061696}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-13} } Tweet on Shared Code between CCleaner and APT17 Missl backdoor
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-18MorphisecMichael Gorelik
@online{gorelik:20170918:morphisec:501cc93, author = {Michael Gorelik}, title = {{Morphisec Discovers CCleaner Backdoor Saving Millions of Avast Users}}, date = {2017-09-18}, organization = {Morphisec}, url = {http://blog.morphisec.com/morphisec-discovers-ccleaner-backdoor}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-08} } Morphisec Discovers CCleaner Backdoor Saving Millions of Avast Users
CCleaner Backdoor
2017-09-18Cisco TalosEdmund Brumaghin, Ross Gibb, Warren Mercer, Matthew Molyett, Craig Williams
@online{brumaghin:20170918:ccleanup:5ba0369, author = {Edmund Brumaghin and Ross Gibb and Warren Mercer and Matthew Molyett and Craig Williams}, title = {{CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk}}, date = {2017-09-18}, organization = {Cisco Talos}, url = {http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2017/09/avast-distributes-malware.html}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-01-08} } CCleanup: A Vast Number of Machines at Risk
CCleaner Backdoor
Yara Rules
[TLP:WHITE] win_ccleaner_backdoor_auto (20230125 | Detects win.ccleaner_backdoor.)
rule win_ccleaner_backdoor_auto {

    meta:
        author = "Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com"
        date = "2023-01-25"
        version = "1"
        description = "Detects win.ccleaner_backdoor."
        info = "autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator"
        tool = "yara-signator v0.6.0"
        signator_config = "callsandjumps;datarefs;binvalue"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ccleaner_backdoor"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20230124"
        malpedia_hash = "2ee0eebba83dce3d019a90519f2f972c0fcf9686"
        malpedia_version = "20230125"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"

    /* DISCLAIMER
     * The strings used in this rule have been automatically selected from the
     * disassembly of memory dumps and unpacked files, using YARA-Signator.
     * The code and documentation is published here:
     * https://github.com/fxb-cocacoding/yara-signator
     * As Malpedia is used as data source, please note that for a given
     * number of families, only single samples are documented.
     * This likely impacts the degree of generalization these rules will offer.
     * Take the described generation method also into consideration when you
     * apply the rules in your use cases and assign them confidence levels.
     */


    strings:
        $sequence_0 = { 750a b857000780 e9???????? e8???????? }
            // n = 4, score = 200
            //   750a                 | jne                 0xc
            //   b857000780           | mov                 eax, 0x80070057
            //   e9????????           |                     
            //   e8????????           |                     

        $sequence_1 = { ff15???????? 8b3d???????? 59 ffd7 }
            // n = 4, score = 200
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   8b3d????????         |                     
            //   59                   | pop                 ecx
            //   ffd7                 | call                edi

        $sequence_2 = { 7405 ff75fc ffd3 6a01 58 }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   7405                 | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [esi + 0xc]
            //   ff75fc               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [eax*4 + 0x10004094]
            //   ffd3                 | and                 dword ptr [ecx + eax*4], 0
            //   6a01                 | inc                 dword ptr [esi + 8]
            //   58                   | inc                 ecx

        $sequence_3 = { 6844494e00 e8???????? 8365e400 8945e0 8d4508 6a04 50 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   6844494e00           | push                0x4e4944
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   8365e400             | and                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x1c], 0
            //   8945e0               | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x20], eax
            //   8d4508               | lea                 eax, [ebp + 8]
            //   6a04                 | push                4
            //   50                   | push                eax

        $sequence_4 = { 488d4b08 4c8b01 ba01000000 41ff10 418bc5 eb41 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   488d4b08             | cmp                 ebx, esp
            //   4c8b01               | jb                  0xffffffce
            //   ba01000000           | test                ebp, ebp
            //   41ff10               | jle                 0x1e7
            //   418bc5               | dec                 eax
            //   eb41                 | lea                 ecx, [ebx + 8]

        $sequence_5 = { 012e 33c0 5f 5e 5d }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   012e                 | push                8
            //   33c0                 | je                  7
            //   5f                   | push                dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   5e                   | call                ebx
            //   5d                   | push                1

        $sequence_6 = { 8b4608 8b4e0c 8b048594400010 83248100 ff4608 }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   8b4608               | call                edi
            //   8b4e0c               | dec                 eax
            //   8b048594400010       | add                 edx, ebp
            //   83248100             | dec                 ecx
            //   ff4608               | cmp                 eax, 2

        $sequence_7 = { 01442418 03c8 8954242c 8b542470 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   01442418             | add                 esp, 0x10
            //   03c8                 | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [esi + 8]
            //   8954242c             | add                 dword ptr [esi], edi
            //   8b542470             | xor                 eax, eax

        $sequence_8 = { 01442424 eb30 8b4508 897518 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   01442424             | mov                 edx, dword ptr [esp + 0x70]
            //   eb30                 | sub                 edx, eax
            //   8b4508               | add                 dword ptr [esp + 0x18], eax
            //   897518               | add                 ecx, eax

        $sequence_9 = { 68???????? ff75fc c745f415000000 ffd3 6a08 68???????? }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   68????????           |                     
            //   ff75fc               | push                dword ptr [ebp + 0x10]
            //   c745f415000000       | push                dword ptr [ebp + 0xc]
            //   ffd3                 | push                esi
            //   6a08                 | mov                 eax, dword ptr [esi + 8]
            //   68????????           |                     

        $sequence_10 = { 7418 80783803 7407 b85d060780 eb10 488b4028 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   7418                 | dec                 esp
            //   80783803             | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ecx]
            //   7407                 | mov                 edx, 1
            //   b85d060780           | inc                 ecx
            //   eb10                 | call                dword ptr [eax]
            //   488b4028             | inc                 ecx

        $sequence_11 = { 488bcb ff5048 488b5c2440 4883c430 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   488bcb               | je                  0xd
            //   ff5048               | mov                 eax, 0x8007065d
            //   488b5c2440           | jmp                 0x1d
            //   4883c430             | dec                 eax

        $sequence_12 = { 01461c 8b542424 85d2 7405 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   01461c               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [esp + 0x10]
            //   8b542424             | cmp                 esi, dword ptr [esp + 0x40]
            //   85d2                 | add                 dword ptr [esp + 0x54], eax
            //   7405                 | add                 edx, ecx

        $sequence_13 = { 013d???????? 8b04b5d8970210 0500080000 3bc8 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   013d????????         |                     
            //   8b04b5d8970210       | pop                 esi
            //   0500080000           | pop                 ebp
            //   3bc8                 | add                 dword ptr [esi], ebp

        $sequence_14 = { 50 c7856cfdffff18619a66 c78570fdffff441ff5a5 c78574fdffff3293dc9d c78578fdffffa7456bbe c7857cfdffffef08d357 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   50                   | push                eax
            //   c7856cfdffff18619a66     | mov    dword ptr [ebp - 0x294], 0x669a6118
            //   c78570fdffff441ff5a5     | mov    dword ptr [ebp - 0x290], 0xa5f51f44
            //   c78574fdffff3293dc9d     | mov    dword ptr [ebp - 0x28c], 0x9ddc9332
            //   c78578fdffffa7456bbe     | mov    dword ptr [ebp - 0x288], 0xbe6b45a7
            //   c7857cfdffffef08d357     | mov    dword ptr [ebp - 0x284], 0x57d308ef

        $sequence_15 = { c745d48e000000 e8???????? 59 8d45fc 59 50 6a28 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   c745d48e000000       | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x2c], 0x8e
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   59                   | pop                 ecx
            //   8d45fc               | lea                 eax, [ebp - 4]
            //   59                   | pop                 ecx
            //   50                   | push                eax
            //   6a28                 | push                0x28

        $sequence_16 = { 8b4dfc a1???????? 89448d08 ff45fc 8b4dfc 8b4508 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   8b4dfc               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   a1????????           |                     
            //   89448d08             | mov                 dword ptr [ebp + ecx*4 + 8], eax
            //   ff45fc               | inc                 dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   8b4dfc               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   8b4508               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp + 8]

        $sequence_17 = { 493bdc 72cc 85ed 0f8edd010000 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   493bdc               | lea                 ecx, [esp + 0x20]
            //   72cc                 | dec                 eax
            //   85ed                 | mov                 edi, dword ptr [esp + 0x20]
            //   0f8edd010000         | dec                 ecx

        $sequence_18 = { 731c b9fcffffff e9???????? 49 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   731c                 | lea                 eax, [ebp + 0x10]
            //   b9fcffffff           | push                edi
            //   e9????????           |                     
            //   49                   | push                eax

        $sequence_19 = { 41 83fe10 0f8329010000 85f6 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   41                   | jbe                 0x11
            //   83fe10               | inc                 ecx
            //   0f8329010000         | mov                 al, byte ptr [edx]
            //   85f6                 | jmp                 0x34

        $sequence_20 = { eb32 8d4510 57 50 ff7510 ff750c 56 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   eb32                 | push                eax
            //   8d4510               | pop                 ecx
            //   57                   | call                esi
            //   50                   | push                eax
            //   ff7510               | pop                 ecx
            //   ff750c               | push                eax
            //   56                   | pop                 ecx

        $sequence_21 = { 488d15f992ffff 488d4c2420 e8???????? 488b7c2420 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   488d15f992ffff       | dec                 eax
            //   488d4c2420           | lea                 edx, [0xffff92f9]
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   488b7c2420           | dec                 eax

        $sequence_22 = { 01442454 03d1 294c2450 8b4c2410 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   01442454             | mov                 dword ptr [ebp + 0x18], esi
            //   03d1                 | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebx + 0x444]
            //   294c2450             | add                 dword ptr [esp + 0x24], eax
            //   8b4c2410             | jmp                 0x36

        $sequence_23 = { 48895108 443b6f04 0f8219ffffff 8b4704 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   48895108             | mov                 eax, ebp
            //   443b6f04             | jmp                 0x43
            //   0f8219ffffff         | je                  0x1a
            //   8b4704               | cmp                 byte ptr [eax + 0x38], 3

        $sequence_24 = { 0ac3 884701 8b4508 eb02 33c0 }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   0ac3                 | or                  al, bl
            //   884701               | mov                 byte ptr [edi + 1], al
            //   8b4508               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp + 8]
            //   eb02                 | jmp                 4
            //   33c0                 | xor                 eax, eax

        $sequence_25 = { 013e 33c0 8b16 83c410 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   013e                 | mov                 eax, dword ptr [esi*4 + 0x100297d8]
            //   33c0                 | add                 eax, 0x800
            //   8b16                 | cmp                 ecx, eax
            //   83c410               | jae                 0x28

        $sequence_26 = { 8acb c0f902 80e10f c0e004 0ac8 880f }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   8acb                 | mov                 cl, bl
            //   c0f902               | sar                 cl, 2
            //   80e10f               | and                 cl, 0xf
            //   c0e004               | shl                 al, 4
            //   0ac8                 | or                  cl, al
            //   880f                 | mov                 byte ptr [edi], cl

        $sequence_27 = { ffd7 be01000000 3bc6 0f85cb010000 39742478 0f85c1010000 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   ffd7                 | call                edi
            //   be01000000           | mov                 esi, 1
            //   3bc6                 | cmp                 eax, esi
            //   0f85cb010000         | jne                 0x1d1
            //   39742478             | cmp                 dword ptr [esp + 0x78], esi
            //   0f85c1010000         | jne                 0x1c7

        $sequence_28 = { 742d 48 0f85bb000000 8a06 50 e8???????? 8ad8 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   742d                 | je                  0x2f
            //   48                   | dec                 eax
            //   0f85bb000000         | jne                 0xc1
            //   8a06                 | mov                 al, byte ptr [esi]
            //   50                   | push                eax
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   8ad8                 | mov                 bl, al

        $sequence_29 = { 48 03d5 49 83f802 760b 41 8a02 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   48                   | push                eax
            //   03d5                 | pop                 ecx
            //   49                   | call                edi
            //   83f802               | pop                 ecx
            //   760b                 | call                edi
            //   41                   | push                edi
            //   8a02                 | call                esi

    condition:
        7 of them and filesize < 377856
}
[TLP:WHITE] win_ccleaner_backdoor_w0   (20180301 | No description)
rule win_ccleaner_backdoor_w0 {
    meta:
        author = "Florian Roth"
        reference = "https://goo.gl/puVc9q"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ccleaner_backdoor"
        malpedia_version = "20180301"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-NC-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"
    strings:
        $s1 = "\\spool\\prtprocs\\w32x86\\localspl.dll" fullword ascii
        $s2 = "\\spool\\prtprocs\\x64\\localspl.dll" fullword ascii
        $s3 = "\\msvcrt.dll" fullword ascii
        $s4 = "\\TSMSISrv.dll" fullword ascii
    condition:
        all of them
}
[TLP:WHITE] win_ccleaner_backdoor_w1   (20180301 | No description)
import "pe"

rule win_ccleaner_backdoor_w1 {
    meta:
        author = "Florian Roth"
        reference = "https://goo.gl/puVc9q"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.ccleaner_backdoor"
        malpedia_version = "20180301"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-NC-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"
    strings:
        $s1 = "Copyright (c) 2007 - 2011 Symantec Corporation" fullword wide
        $s2 = "\\\\.\\SYMEFA" fullword wide
    condition:
        all of them and pe.number_of_signatures == 0
}
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