SYMBOLCOMMON_NAMEaka. SYNONYMS
win.invisimole (Back to overview)

InvisiMole


InvisiMole had a modular architecture, starting with a wrapper DLL, and performing its activities using two other modules that were embedded in its resources, named RC2FM and RC2CL. They were feature-rich backdoors and turned the affected computer into a video camera, letting the attackers to spy the victim.
The malicious actors behind this malware were active at least since 2013 in highly targeted campaigns with only a few dozen compromised computers in Ukraine and Russia. The wrapper DLL posed as a legitimate mpr.dll library and was placed in the same folder as explorer.exe, which made it being loaded during the Windows startup into the Windows Explorer process instead of the legitimate library.
Malware came in both 32-bit and 64-bit versions, which made this persistence technique functional on both architectures.

The smaller of the modules, RC2FM, contained a backdoor with fifteen supported commands indexed by numbers. The commands could perform simple changes on the system and spying features like capturing sounds, taking screenshots or monitoring all fixed and removable drives.

The second module, RC2CL, offered features for collecting as much data about the infected computer as possible, rather than for making system changes. The module supported up to 84 commands such as file system operations, file execution, registry key manipulation, remote shell activation, wireless network scanning, listing of installed software etc. Though the backdoor was capable of interfering with the system (e.g. to log off a user, terminate a process or shut down the system), it mostly provided passive operations. Whenever possible, it tried to hide its activities by restoring the original file access time or safe-deleting its traces.

References
2022-11-27cocomelonccocomelonc
@online{cocomelonc:20221127:malware:e3f9492, author = {cocomelonc}, title = {{Malware development tricks: part 24. ListPlanting. Simple C++ example.}}, date = {2022-11-27}, organization = {cocomelonc}, url = {https://cocomelonc.github.io/malware/2022/11/27/malware-tricks-24.html}, language = {English}, urldate = {2022-11-28} } Malware development tricks: part 24. ListPlanting. Simple C++ example.
InvisiMole
2022-08-18TrustwavePawel Knapczyk
@online{knapczyk:20220818:overview:bf3eca2, author = {Pawel Knapczyk}, title = {{Overview of the Cyber Weapons Used in the Ukraine - Russia War}}, date = {2022-08-18}, organization = {Trustwave}, url = {https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/overview-of-the-cyber-weapons-used-in-the-ukraine-russia-war/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2022-08-28} } Overview of the Cyber Weapons Used in the Ukraine - Russia War
AcidRain CaddyWiper Cobalt Strike CredoMap DCRat DoubleZero GraphSteel GrimPlant HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 InvisiMole IsaacWiper PartyTicket
2022-08-18TrustwavePawel Knapczyk
@online{knapczyk:20220818:overview:a12950c, author = {Pawel Knapczyk}, title = {{Overview of the Cyber Weapons Used in the Ukraine - Russia War}}, date = {2022-08-18}, organization = {Trustwave}, url = {https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/overview-of-the-cyber-weapons-used-in-the-ukraine-russia-war}, language = {English}, urldate = {2022-08-22} } Overview of the Cyber Weapons Used in the Ukraine - Russia War
AcidRain CaddyWiper Cobalt Strike CredoMap DCRat DoubleZero GraphSteel GrimPlant HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 InvisiMole IsaacWiper PartyTicket
2022-01-11ESET ResearchMichal Poslušný
@online{poslun:20220111:signed:1c59d41, author = {Michal Poslušný}, title = {{Signed kernel drivers – Unguarded gateway to Windows’ core}}, date = {2022-01-11}, organization = {ESET Research}, url = {https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/11/signed-kernel-drivers-unguarded-gateway-windows-core/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2022-01-18} } Signed kernel drivers – Unguarded gateway to Windows’ core
InvisiMole LoJax RobinHood Slingshot
2021-04-29ESET ResearchRobert Lipovsky, Matthieu Faou, Tony Anscombe, Andy Garth, Daniel Chromek
@techreport{lipovsky:20210429:eset:ff67b6c, author = {Robert Lipovsky and Matthieu Faou and Tony Anscombe and Andy Garth and Daniel Chromek}, title = {{ESET Industry Report on Government: Targeted but not alone}}, date = {2021-04-29}, institution = {ESET Research}, url = {https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/ESET_Industry_Report_Government.pdf}, language = {English}, urldate = {2021-05-03} } ESET Industry Report on Government: Targeted but not alone
Exaramel Crutch Exaramel HyperBro HyperSSL InvisiMole XDSpy
2020-06-18ESET ResearchZuzana Hromcová, Anton Cherepanov
@online{hromcov:20200618:digging:285d02f, author = {Zuzana Hromcová and Anton Cherepanov}, title = {{Digging up InvisiMole’s hidden arsenal}}, date = {2020-06-18}, organization = {ESET Research}, url = {https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/06/18/digging-up-invisimole-hidden-arsenal/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-06-29} } Digging up InvisiMole’s hidden arsenal
InvisiMole Gamaredon Group InvisiMole
2020-06-08ESET ResearchZuzana Hromcová, Anton Cherepanov
@techreport{hromcov:20200608:invisimole:70a4dc1, author = {Zuzana Hromcová and Anton Cherepanov}, title = {{InvisiMole: The Hidden Part of the Story - Unearthing InvisiMole's Espionage Toolset and Strategic Cooperations}}, date = {2020-06-08}, institution = {ESET Research}, url = {https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ESET_InvisiMole.pdf}, language = {English}, urldate = {2020-06-29} } InvisiMole: The Hidden Part of the Story - Unearthing InvisiMole's Espionage Toolset and Strategic Cooperations
InvisiMole RC2FM
2018-06-07ESET ResearchZuzana Hromcová
@online{hromcov:20180607:invisimole:5c5f0ed, author = {Zuzana Hromcová}, title = {{InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013}}, date = {2018-06-07}, organization = {ESET Research}, url = {https://www.welivesecurity.com/2018/06/07/invisimole-equipped-spyware-undercover/}, language = {English}, urldate = {2019-11-14} } InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013
InvisiMole InvisiMole
Yara Rules
[TLP:WHITE] win_invisimole_auto (20230715 | Detects win.invisimole.)
rule win_invisimole_auto {

    meta:
        author = "Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com"
        date = "2023-07-11"
        version = "1"
        description = "Detects win.invisimole."
        info = "autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator"
        tool = "yara-signator v0.6.0"
        signator_config = "callsandjumps;datarefs;binvalue"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.invisimole"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20230705"
        malpedia_hash = "42d0574f4405bd7d2b154d321d345acb18834a41"
        malpedia_version = "20230715"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"

    /* DISCLAIMER
     * The strings used in this rule have been automatically selected from the
     * disassembly of memory dumps and unpacked files, using YARA-Signator.
     * The code and documentation is published here:
     * https://github.com/fxb-cocacoding/yara-signator
     * As Malpedia is used as data source, please note that for a given
     * number of families, only single samples are documented.
     * This likely impacts the degree of generalization these rules will offer.
     * Take the described generation method also into consideration when you
     * apply the rules in your use cases and assign them confidence levels.
     */


    strings:
        $sequence_0 = { 6a0c 6a08 50 ff15???????? 8bf0 85f6 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   6a0c                 | push                0xc
            //   6a08                 | push                8
            //   50                   | push                eax
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   8bf0                 | mov                 esi, eax
            //   85f6                 | test                esi, esi

        $sequence_1 = { 837dfc04 8bc1 0f848e110000 8d4dc8 51 8d75fc e8???????? }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   837dfc04             | cmp                 dword ptr [ebp - 4], 4
            //   8bc1                 | mov                 eax, ecx
            //   0f848e110000         | je                  0x1194
            //   8d4dc8               | lea                 ecx, [ebp - 0x38]
            //   51                   | push                ecx
            //   8d75fc               | lea                 esi, [ebp - 4]
            //   e8????????           |                     

        $sequence_2 = { 8b8748020000 6a00 8d8d2cffffff 51 6800200000 52 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   8b8748020000         | mov                 eax, dword ptr [edi + 0x248]
            //   6a00                 | push                0
            //   8d8d2cffffff         | lea                 ecx, [ebp - 0xd4]
            //   51                   | push                ecx
            //   6800200000           | push                0x2000
            //   52                   | push                edx

        $sequence_3 = { 837dfc04 0f84bd090000 8d4dc8 51 8d75fc }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   837dfc04             | cmp                 dword ptr [ebp - 4], 4
            //   0f84bd090000         | je                  0x9c3
            //   8d4dc8               | lea                 ecx, [ebp - 0x38]
            //   51                   | push                ecx
            //   8d75fc               | lea                 esi, [ebp - 4]

        $sequence_4 = { 6a08 52 ffd7 8bd8 85db 0f84c7000000 68???????? }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   6a08                 | push                8
            //   52                   | push                edx
            //   ffd7                 | call                edi
            //   8bd8                 | mov                 ebx, eax
            //   85db                 | test                ebx, ebx
            //   0f84c7000000         | je                  0xcd
            //   68????????           |                     

        $sequence_5 = { 33c9 66837c43fe5c 66890c43 8d4c43fe 894df4 0f8551060000 b902000000 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   33c9                 | xor                 ecx, ecx
            //   66837c43fe5c         | cmp                 word ptr [ebx + eax*2 - 2], 0x5c
            //   66890c43             | mov                 word ptr [ebx + eax*2], cx
            //   8d4c43fe             | lea                 ecx, [ebx + eax*2 - 2]
            //   894df4               | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0xc], ecx
            //   0f8551060000         | jne                 0x657
            //   b902000000           | mov                 ecx, 2

        $sequence_6 = { 72d1 8955f0 85d2 7511 8b55ec 8b4d08 52 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   72d1                 | jb                  0xffffffd3
            //   8955f0               | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x10], edx
            //   85d2                 | test                edx, edx
            //   7511                 | jne                 0x13
            //   8b55ec               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp - 0x14]
            //   8b4d08               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 8]
            //   52                   | push                edx

        $sequence_7 = { 81fb08020000 0f8392000000 8b7df8 8a9746020000 0a5710 8b45e8 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   81fb08020000         | cmp                 ebx, 0x208
            //   0f8392000000         | jae                 0x98
            //   8b7df8               | mov                 edi, dword ptr [ebp - 8]
            //   8a9746020000         | mov                 dl, byte ptr [edi + 0x246]
            //   0a5710               | or                  dl, byte ptr [edi + 0x10]
            //   8b45e8               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 0x18]

        $sequence_8 = { 53 56 ff15???????? 85c0 0f8595000000 3975fc 0f848c000000 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   53                   | push                ebx
            //   56                   | push                esi
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   85c0                 | test                eax, eax
            //   0f8595000000         | jne                 0x9b
            //   3975fc               | cmp                 dword ptr [ebp - 4], esi
            //   0f848c000000         | je                  0x92

        $sequence_9 = { 3bce 72e5 8b0d???????? 52 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   3bce                 | cmp                 ecx, esi
            //   72e5                 | jb                  0xffffffe7
            //   8b0d????????         |                     
            //   52                   | push                edx

    condition:
        7 of them and filesize < 139264
}
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