SYMBOLCOMMON_NAMEaka. SYNONYMS
win.invisimole (Back to overview)

InvisiMole

VTCollection    

InvisiMole had a modular architecture, starting with a wrapper DLL, and performing its activities using two other modules that were embedded in its resources, named RC2FM and RC2CL. They were feature-rich backdoors and turned the affected computer into a video camera, letting the attackers to spy the victim.
The malicious actors behind this malware were active at least since 2013 in highly targeted campaigns with only a few dozen compromised computers in Ukraine and Russia. The wrapper DLL posed as a legitimate mpr.dll library and was placed in the same folder as explorer.exe, which made it being loaded during the Windows startup into the Windows Explorer process instead of the legitimate library.
Malware came in both 32-bit and 64-bit versions, which made this persistence technique functional on both architectures.

The smaller of the modules, RC2FM, contained a backdoor with fifteen supported commands indexed by numbers. The commands could perform simple changes on the system and spying features like capturing sounds, taking screenshots or monitoring all fixed and removable drives.

The second module, RC2CL, offered features for collecting as much data about the infected computer as possible, rather than for making system changes. The module supported up to 84 commands such as file system operations, file execution, registry key manipulation, remote shell activation, wireless network scanning, listing of installed software etc. Though the backdoor was capable of interfering with the system (e.g. to log off a user, terminate a process or shut down the system), it mostly provided passive operations. Whenever possible, it tried to hide its activities by restoring the original file access time or safe-deleting its traces.

References
2022-11-27cocomelonccocomelonc
Malware development tricks: part 24. ListPlanting. Simple C++ example.
InvisiMole
2022-08-18TrustwavePawel Knapczyk
Overview of the Cyber Weapons Used in the Ukraine - Russia War
AcidRain CaddyWiper Cobalt Strike CredoMap DCRat DoubleZero GraphSteel GrimPlant HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 InvisiMole IsaacWiper PartyTicket
2022-08-18TrustwavePawel Knapczyk
Overview of the Cyber Weapons Used in the Ukraine - Russia War
AcidRain CaddyWiper Cobalt Strike CredoMap DCRat DoubleZero GraphSteel GrimPlant HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 InvisiMole IsaacWiper PartyTicket
2022-01-11ESET ResearchMichal Poslušný
Signed kernel drivers – Unguarded gateway to Windows’ core
InvisiMole LoJax RobinHood Slingshot
2021-04-29ESET ResearchAndy Garth, Daniel Chromek, Matthieu Faou, Robert Lipovsky, Tony Anscombe
ESET Industry Report on Government: Targeted but not alone
Exaramel Crutch Exaramel HyperBro HyperSSL InvisiMole XDSpy
2020-06-18ESET ResearchAnton Cherepanov, Zuzana Hromcová
Digging up InvisiMole’s hidden arsenal
InvisiMole Gamaredon Group InvisiMole
2020-06-08ESET ResearchAnton Cherepanov, Zuzana Hromcová
InvisiMole: The Hidden Part of the Story - Unearthing InvisiMole's Espionage Toolset and Strategic Cooperations
InvisiMole RC2FM
2018-06-07ESET ResearchZuzana Hromcová
InvisiMole: Surprisingly equipped spyware, undercover since 2013
InvisiMole InvisiMole
Yara Rules
[TLP:WHITE] win_invisimole_auto (20241030 | Detects win.invisimole.)
rule win_invisimole_auto {

    meta:
        author = "Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com"
        date = "2024-10-31"
        version = "1"
        description = "Detects win.invisimole."
        info = "autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator"
        tool = "yara-signator v0.6.0"
        signator_config = "callsandjumps;datarefs;binvalue"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.invisimole"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20241030"
        malpedia_hash = "26e26953c49c8efafbf72a38076855d578e0a2e4"
        malpedia_version = "20241030"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"

    /* DISCLAIMER
     * The strings used in this rule have been automatically selected from the
     * disassembly of memory dumps and unpacked files, using YARA-Signator.
     * The code and documentation is published here:
     * https://github.com/fxb-cocacoding/yara-signator
     * As Malpedia is used as data source, please note that for a given
     * number of families, only single samples are documented.
     * This likely impacts the degree of generalization these rules will offer.
     * Take the described generation method also into consideration when you
     * apply the rules in your use cases and assign them confidence levels.
     */


    strings:
        $sequence_0 = { 52 33c9 57 66890b ff15???????? 6a10 6a00 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   52                   | push                edx
            //   33c9                 | xor                 ecx, ecx
            //   57                   | push                edi
            //   66890b               | mov                 word ptr [ebx], cx
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   6a10                 | push                0x10
            //   6a00                 | push                0

        $sequence_1 = { 8d4de4 51 8d88980f0000 51 c745eca8a94000 8955f0 c745f41e000000 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   8d4de4               | lea                 ecx, [ebp - 0x1c]
            //   51                   | push                ecx
            //   8d88980f0000         | lea                 ecx, [eax + 0xf98]
            //   51                   | push                ecx
            //   c745eca8a94000       | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x14], 0x40a9a8
            //   8955f0               | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x10], edx
            //   c745f41e000000       | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0xc], 0x1e

        $sequence_2 = { ff15???????? 8b55f4 53 33c9 52 66890f }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   8b55f4               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp - 0xc]
            //   53                   | push                ebx
            //   33c9                 | xor                 ecx, ecx
            //   52                   | push                edx
            //   66890f               | mov                 word ptr [edi], cx

        $sequence_3 = { 8bc1 0f848e110000 8d4dc8 51 8d75fc e8???????? 8bf0 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   8bc1                 | mov                 eax, ecx
            //   0f848e110000         | je                  0x1194
            //   8d4dc8               | lea                 ecx, [ebp - 0x38]
            //   51                   | push                ecx
            //   8d75fc               | lea                 esi, [ebp - 4]
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   8bf0                 | mov                 esi, eax

        $sequence_4 = { 8b7d8c 85ff 7450 33f6 3975ac 7628 83c704 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   8b7d8c               | mov                 edi, dword ptr [ebp - 0x74]
            //   85ff                 | test                edi, edi
            //   7450                 | je                  0x52
            //   33f6                 | xor                 esi, esi
            //   3975ac               | cmp                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x54], esi
            //   7628                 | jbe                 0x2a
            //   83c704               | add                 edi, 4

        $sequence_5 = { c645bc0d 668955bd 894dbf 8bde 7409 83c302 66833b2a }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   c645bc0d             | mov                 byte ptr [ebp - 0x44], 0xd
            //   668955bd             | mov                 word ptr [ebp - 0x43], dx
            //   894dbf               | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x41], ecx
            //   8bde                 | mov                 ebx, esi
            //   7409                 | je                  0xb
            //   83c302               | add                 ebx, 2
            //   66833b2a             | cmp                 word ptr [ebx], 0x2a

        $sequence_6 = { e8???????? 0fb64636 6a01 8d4dff 51 57 8845ff }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   0fb64636             | movzx               eax, byte ptr [esi + 0x36]
            //   6a01                 | push                1
            //   8d4dff               | lea                 ecx, [ebp - 1]
            //   51                   | push                ecx
            //   57                   | push                edi
            //   8845ff               | mov                 byte ptr [ebp - 1], al

        $sequence_7 = { c7464c00000080 c703ffffffff c6466c00 ff15???????? 8d55f0 52 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   c7464c00000080       | mov                 dword ptr [esi + 0x4c], 0x80000000
            //   c703ffffffff         | mov                 dword ptr [ebx], 0xffffffff
            //   c6466c00             | mov                 byte ptr [esi + 0x6c], 0
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   8d55f0               | lea                 edx, [ebp - 0x10]
            //   52                   | push                edx

        $sequence_8 = { 53 56 ff15???????? 85c0 0f8595000000 3975fc 0f848c000000 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   53                   | push                ebx
            //   56                   | push                esi
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   85c0                 | test                eax, eax
            //   0f8595000000         | jne                 0x9b
            //   3975fc               | cmp                 dword ptr [ebp - 4], esi
            //   0f848c000000         | je                  0x92

        $sequence_9 = { ff15???????? 8b4c2414 668944cf04 8b44241c 41 }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   8b4c2414             | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [esp + 0x14]
            //   668944cf04           | mov                 word ptr [edi + ecx*8 + 4], ax
            //   8b44241c             | mov                 eax, dword ptr [esp + 0x1c]
            //   41                   | inc                 ecx

    condition:
        7 of them and filesize < 139264
}
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