SYMBOLCOMMON_NAMEaka. SYNONYMS
win.industroyer2 (Back to overview)

INDUSTROYER2

Actor(s): Sandworm

VTCollection    

There is no description at this point.

References
2024-04-16 ⋅ Mandiant ⋅ Alden Wahlstrom, Anton Prokopenkov, Dan Black, Dan Perez, Gabby Roncone, John Wolfram, Lexie Aytes, Nick Simonian, Ryan Hall, Tyler McLellan
APT44: Unearthing Sandworm
VPNFilter BlackEnergy CaddyWiper EternalPetya HermeticWiper Industroyer INDUSTROYER2 Olympic Destroyer PartyTicket RoarBAT Sandworm
2024-04-15 ⋅ UC Santa Cruz ⋅ Alonso Rojas, Alvaro A. Cardenas, Bing Huang, Emmanuele Zambon, Juan Lozano, Keerthi Koneru, Luis Salazar, Marina Krotofil, Ross Baldick, Sebastian R. Castro
A Tale of Two Industroyers: It was the Season of Darkness
Industroyer INDUSTROYER2
2023-07-12 ⋅ Mandiant ⋅ Dan Black, Gabby Roncone
The GRU's Disruptive Playbook
CaddyWiper INDUSTROYER2 XakNet
2023-04-18 ⋅ Mandiant ⋅ Mandiant
M-Trends 2023
QUIETEXIT AppleJeus Black Basta BlackCat CaddyWiper Cobalt Strike Dharma HermeticWiper Hive INDUSTROYER2 Ladon LockBit Meterpreter PartyTicket PlugX QakBot REvil Royal Ransom SystemBC WhisperGate
2023-04-14 ⋅ Dragos ⋅ Dragos
2022 ICS/OT Threat Landscape Recap & What to Watch for This Year
INDUSTROYER2 Wassonite
2023-03-15 ⋅ Microsoft ⋅ Microsoft Threat Intelligence
A year of Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine
CaddyWiper DesertBlade DoubleZero HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 IsaacWiper PartyTicket SwiftSlicer WhisperGate
2023-02-15 ⋅ Google ⋅ Google Threat Analysis Group, Mandiant
Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape
CaddyWiper Dharma HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 PartyTicket WhisperGate Callisto Curious Gorge MUSTANG PANDA Turla
2022-10-24 ⋅ Youtube (Virus Bulletin) ⋅ Alexander Adamov
Russian wipers in the cyberwar against Ukraine
AcidRain CaddyWiper DesertBlade DoubleZero EternalPetya HermeticWiper HermeticWizard INDUSTROYER2 IsaacWiper KillDisk PartyTicket WhisperGate
2022-08-18 ⋅ Trustwave ⋅ Pawel Knapczyk
Overview of the Cyber Weapons Used in the Ukraine - Russia War
AcidRain CaddyWiper Cobalt Strike CredoMap DCRat DoubleZero GraphSteel GrimPlant HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 InvisiMole IsaacWiper PartyTicket
2022-08-18 ⋅ Trustwave ⋅ Pawel Knapczyk
Overview of the Cyber Weapons Used in the Ukraine - Russia War
AcidRain CaddyWiper Cobalt Strike CredoMap DCRat DoubleZero GraphSteel GrimPlant HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 InvisiMole IsaacWiper PartyTicket
2022-06-23 ⋅ splunk ⋅ Splunk Threat Research Team
Threat Update: Industroyer2
INDUSTROYER2
2022-05-31 ⋅ NOZOMI Network Labs ⋅ Giannis Tsaraias, Ivan Speziale
Industroyer vs. Industroyer2: Evolution of the IEC 104 Component
INDUSTROYER2
2022-05-18 ⋅ ntop ⋅ ntop
How ntopng monitors IEC 60870-5-104 traffic
INDUSTROYER2
2022-05-12 ⋅ Blackberry ⋅ The BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team
Threat Thursday: Malware Rebooted - How Industroyer2 Takes Aim at Ukraine Infrastructure
INDUSTROYER2
2022-05-02 ⋅ AT&T ⋅ Fernando Martinez
Analysis on recent wiper attacks: examples and how wiper malware works
AcidRain CaddyWiper DoubleZero HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 IsaacWiper
2022-04-27 ⋅ Nozomi Networks ⋅ Nozomi Networks Labs
Industroyer2: Nozomi Networks Labs Analyzes the IEC 104 Payload
INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-27 ⋅ Microsoft ⋅ Microsoft Digital Security Unit (DSU)
Special Report: Ukraine An overview of Russia’s cyberattack activity in Ukraine
CaddyWiper DoubleZero HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 IsaacWiper PartyTicket WhisperGate
2022-04-25 ⋅ Netresec ⋅ Erik Hjelmvik
Industroyer2 IEC-104 Analysis
INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-25 ⋅ Mandiant ⋅ Chris Sistrunk, Corey Hildebrandt, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Keith Lunden, Ken Proska, Nathan Brubaker, Raymond Leong
INDUSTROYER.V2: Old Malware Learns New Tricks
INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-23 ⋅ Stranded on Pylos Blog ⋅ Joe Slowik
Industroyer2 in Perspective
INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-14 ⋅ SCADAfence ⋅ Maayan Fishelov
Industroyer2: ICS Networks need to heighten vigilance - SCADAfence
INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-12 ⋅ ⋅ Cert-UA ⋅ Cert-UA
Cyberattack of Sandworm Group (UAC-0082) on energy facilities of Ukraine using malicious programs INDUSTROYER2 and CADDYWIPER (CERT-UA # 4435)
CaddyWiper Industroyer INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-12 ⋅ Twitter (@silascutler) ⋅ Silas Cutler
Tweet on analysis of CADDYWIPER used alongside with INDUSTROYER2
CaddyWiper INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-12 ⋅ ESET Research ⋅ ESET Ireland
Industroyer2: Industroyer reloaded
CaddyWiper INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-12 ⋅ ESET Research ⋅ ESET Research
Industroyer2: Industroyer reloaded
ArguePatch CaddyWiper Industroyer INDUSTROYER2
2022-02-28 ⋅ Microsoft ⋅ MSRC Team
Cyber threat activity in Ukraine: analysis and resources
CaddyWiper DesertBlade DoubleZero HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 IsaacWiper PartyTicket WhisperGate DEV-0586
Yara Rules
[TLP:WHITE] win_industroyer2_auto (20260917 | Detects win.industroyer2.)
rule win_industroyer2_auto {

    meta:
        author = "Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com"
        date = "2026-09-17"
        version = "1"
        description = "Detects win.industroyer2."
        info = "autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator"
        tool = "yara-signator v0.6.0"
        signator_config = "callsandjumps;datarefs;binvalue"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.industroyer2"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20260916"
        malpedia_hash = "53a643781c18e08f4a50949af60172d837a0b6f6"
        malpedia_version = "20260917"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"

    /* DISCLAIMER
     * The strings used in this rule have been automatically selected from the
     * disassembly of memory dumps and unpacked files, using YARA-Signator.
     * The code and documentation is published here:
     * https://github.com/fxb-cocacoding/yara-signator
     * As Malpedia is used as data source, please note that for a given
     * number of families, only single samples are documented.
     * This likely impacts the degree of generalization these rules will offer.
     * Take the described generation method also into consideration when you
     * apply the rules in your use cases and assign them confidence levels.
     */


    strings:
        $sequence_0 = { 7e1f 837dfc14 7319 8b4d08 8b11 }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   7e1f                 | jle                 0x21
            //   837dfc14             | cmp                 dword ptr [ebp - 4], 0x14
            //   7319                 | jae                 0x1b
            //   8b4d08               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 8]
            //   8b11                 | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ecx]

        $sequence_1 = { 740e 837d1000 7408 8b4d0c 3b4d14 7307 33c0 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   740e                 | je                  0x10
            //   837d1000             | cmp                 dword ptr [ebp + 0x10], 0
            //   7408                 | je                  0xa
            //   8b4d0c               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 0xc]
            //   3b4d14               | cmp                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 0x14]
            //   7307                 | jae                 9
            //   33c0                 | xor                 eax, eax

        $sequence_2 = { 8b4d10 898838000100 8b55fc 8a4514 888245000100 8b4dfc 8a5518 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   8b4d10               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 0x10]
            //   898838000100         | mov                 dword ptr [eax + 0x10038], ecx
            //   8b55fc               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   8a4514               | mov                 al, byte ptr [ebp + 0x14]
            //   888245000100         | mov                 byte ptr [edx + 0x10045], al
            //   8b4dfc               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   8a5518               | mov                 dl, byte ptr [ebp + 0x18]

        $sequence_3 = { 52 e8???????? 68e8030000 ff15???????? c745f000100000 6800000100 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   52                   | push                edx
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   68e8030000           | push                0x3e8
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   c745f000100000       | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x10], 0x1000
            //   6800000100           | push                0x10000

        $sequence_4 = { 8b4804 894de8 837d0c00 0f84a5010000 837d1000 0f8e9b010000 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   8b4804               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [eax + 4]
            //   894de8               | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x18], ecx
            //   837d0c00             | cmp                 dword ptr [ebp + 0xc], 0
            //   0f84a5010000         | je                  0x1ab
            //   837d1000             | cmp                 dword ptr [ebp + 0x10], 0
            //   0f8e9b010000         | jle                 0x1a1

        $sequence_5 = { 0f8d42010000 8b4d08 8b9148010100 8b45f4 8b0c82 8b510c 3b55ec }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   0f8d42010000         | jge                 0x148
            //   8b4d08               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 8]
            //   8b9148010100         | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ecx + 0x10148]
            //   8b45f4               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 0xc]
            //   8b0c82               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [edx + eax*4]
            //   8b510c               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ecx + 0xc]
            //   3b55ec               | cmp                 edx, dword ptr [ebp - 0x14]

        $sequence_6 = { 7538 0fb64dff 85c9 7418 8b55f8 8b4204 0fb6480c }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   7538                 | jne                 0x3a
            //   0fb64dff             | movzx               ecx, byte ptr [ebp - 1]
            //   85c9                 | test                ecx, ecx
            //   7418                 | je                  0x1a
            //   8b55f8               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp - 8]
            //   8b4204               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [edx + 4]
            //   0fb6480c             | movzx               ecx, byte ptr [eax + 0xc]

        $sequence_7 = { e8???????? 50 ff15???????? 50 6850680000 8b5514 81c21d000100 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   50                   | push                eax
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   50                   | push                eax
            //   6850680000           | push                0x6850
            //   8b5514               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp + 0x14]
            //   81c21d000100         | add                 edx, 0x1001d

        $sequence_8 = { 8b4508 c6801b00010001 8b4d08 c7410400000000 }
            // n = 4, score = 100
            //   8b4508               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp + 8]
            //   c6801b00010001       | mov                 byte ptr [eax + 0x1001b], 1
            //   8b4d08               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 8]
            //   c7410400000000       | mov                 dword ptr [ecx + 4], 0

        $sequence_9 = { 8b5508 8b45fc 8a4004 88040a b901000000 c1e100 8b5508 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   8b5508               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp + 8]
            //   8b45fc               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   8a4004               | mov                 al, byte ptr [eax + 4]
            //   88040a               | mov                 byte ptr [edx + ecx], al
            //   b901000000           | mov                 ecx, 1
            //   c1e100               | shl                 ecx, 0
            //   8b5508               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp + 8]

    condition:
        7 of them and filesize < 100352
}
[TLP:WHITE] win_industroyer2_w0   (20220905 | Industroyer2 malware targeting power grid components.)
// Created by Nozomi Networks Labs

rule win_industroyer2_w0 {
    meta:
        author = "Nozomi Networks Labs"
        name = "Industroyer2"
        description = "Industroyer2 malware targeting power grid components."
        actor = "Sandworm"
        source="https://www.nozominetworks.com/downloads/US/Nozomi-Networks-WP-Industroyer2.pdf"
        hash = "D69665F56DDEF7AD4E71971F06432E59F1510A7194386E5F0E8926AEA7B88E00"

        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.industroyer2"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20220905"
        malpedia_hash = "6ec06c64bcfdbeda64eff021c766b4ce34542b71"
        malpedia_version = "20220905"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-NC-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"
    strings:
        $s1 = "%02d:%lS" wide ascii
        $s2 = "PService_PPD.exe" wide ascii
        $s3 = "D:\\OIK\\DevCounter" wide ascii
        $s4 = "MSTR ->> SLV" fullword wide ascii
        $s5 = "MSTR <<- SLV" fullword wide ascii
        $s6 = "Current operation : %s"
        $s7 = "Switch value: %s"
        $s8 = "Unknown APDU format !!!"
        $s9 = "Length:%u bytes |"
        $s10 = "Sent=x%X | Received=x%X"
        $s11 = "ASDU:%u | OA:%u | IOA:%u |"
        $s12 = "Cause: %s (x%X) | Telegram type: %s (x%X)"

    condition:
        5 of them
}
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