SYMBOLCOMMON_NAMEaka. SYNONYMS
win.industroyer2 (Back to overview)

INDUSTROYER2

Actor(s): Sandworm

VTCollection    

There is no description at this point.

References
2023-07-12MandiantDan Black, Gabby Roncone
The GRU's Disruptive Playbook
CaddyWiper INDUSTROYER2 XakNet
2023-04-18MandiantMandiant
M-Trends 2023
QUIETEXIT AppleJeus Black Basta BlackCat CaddyWiper Cobalt Strike Dharma HermeticWiper Hive INDUSTROYER2 Ladon LockBit Meterpreter PartyTicket PlugX QakBot REvil Royal Ransom SystemBC WhisperGate
2023-03-15MicrosoftMicrosoft Threat Intelligence
A year of Russian hybrid warfare in Ukraine
CaddyWiper DesertBlade DoubleZero HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 IsaacWiper PartyTicket SwiftSlicer WhisperGate
2023-02-15GoogleGoogle Threat Analysis Group, Mandiant
Fog of War: How the Ukraine Conflict Transformed the Cyber Threat Landscape
CaddyWiper Dharma HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 PartyTicket WhisperGate Callisto Curious Gorge MUSTANG PANDA Turla
2022-10-24Youtube (Virus Bulletin)Alexander Adamov
Russian wipers in the cyberwar against Ukraine
AcidRain CaddyWiper DesertBlade DoubleZero EternalPetya HermeticWiper HermeticWizard INDUSTROYER2 IsaacWiper KillDisk PartyTicket WhisperGate
2022-08-18TrustwavePawel Knapczyk
Overview of the Cyber Weapons Used in the Ukraine - Russia War
AcidRain CaddyWiper Cobalt Strike CredoMap DCRat DoubleZero GraphSteel GrimPlant HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 InvisiMole IsaacWiper PartyTicket
2022-08-18TrustwavePawel Knapczyk
Overview of the Cyber Weapons Used in the Ukraine - Russia War
AcidRain CaddyWiper Cobalt Strike CredoMap DCRat DoubleZero GraphSteel GrimPlant HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 InvisiMole IsaacWiper PartyTicket
2022-06-23splunkSplunk Threat Research Team
Threat Update: Industroyer2
INDUSTROYER2
2022-05-31NOZOMI Network LabsGiannis Tsaraias, Ivan Speziale
Industroyer vs. Industroyer2: Evolution of the IEC 104 Component
INDUSTROYER2
2022-05-18ntopntop
How ntopng monitors IEC 60870-5-104 traffic
INDUSTROYER2
2022-05-12BlackberryThe BlackBerry Research & Intelligence Team
Threat Thursday: Malware Rebooted - How Industroyer2 Takes Aim at Ukraine Infrastructure
INDUSTROYER2
2022-05-02AT&TFernando Martinez
Analysis on recent wiper attacks: examples and how wiper malware works
AcidRain CaddyWiper DoubleZero HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 IsaacWiper
2022-04-27MicrosoftMicrosoft Digital Security Unit (DSU)
Special Report: Ukraine An overview of Russia’s cyberattack activity in Ukraine
CaddyWiper DoubleZero HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 IsaacWiper PartyTicket WhisperGate
2022-04-27Nozomi NetworksNozomi Networks Labs
Industroyer2: Nozomi Networks Labs Analyzes the IEC 104 Payload
INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-25MandiantChris Sistrunk, Corey Hildebrandt, Daniel Kapellmann Zafra, Keith Lunden, Ken Proska, Nathan Brubaker, Raymond Leong
INDUSTROYER.V2: Old Malware Learns New Tricks
INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-25NetresecErik Hjelmvik
Industroyer2 IEC-104 Analysis
INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-23Stranded on Pylos BlogJoe Slowik
Industroyer2 in Perspective
INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-14SCADAfenceMaayan Fishelov
Industroyer2: ICS Networks need to heighten vigilance - SCADAfence
INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-12Cert-UACert-UA
Cyberattack of Sandworm Group (UAC-0082) on energy facilities of Ukraine using malicious programs INDUSTROYER2 and CADDYWIPER (CERT-UA # 4435)
CaddyWiper Industroyer INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-12ESET ResearchESET Research
Industroyer2: Industroyer reloaded
ArguePatch CaddyWiper Industroyer INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-12Twitter (@silascutler)Silas Cutler
Tweet on analysis of CADDYWIPER used alongside with INDUSTROYER2
CaddyWiper INDUSTROYER2
2022-04-12ESET ResearchESET Ireland
Industroyer2: Industroyer reloaded
CaddyWiper INDUSTROYER2
2022-02-28MicrosoftMSRC Team
Cyber threat activity in Ukraine: analysis and resources
CaddyWiper DesertBlade DoubleZero HermeticWiper INDUSTROYER2 IsaacWiper PartyTicket WhisperGate DEV-0586
Yara Rules
[TLP:WHITE] win_industroyer2_auto (20230808 | Detects win.industroyer2.)
rule win_industroyer2_auto {

    meta:
        author = "Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com"
        date = "2023-12-06"
        version = "1"
        description = "Detects win.industroyer2."
        info = "autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator"
        tool = "yara-signator v0.6.0"
        signator_config = "callsandjumps;datarefs;binvalue"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.industroyer2"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20231130"
        malpedia_hash = "fc8a0e9f343f6d6ded9e7df1a64dac0cc68d7351"
        malpedia_version = "20230808"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"

    /* DISCLAIMER
     * The strings used in this rule have been automatically selected from the
     * disassembly of memory dumps and unpacked files, using YARA-Signator.
     * The code and documentation is published here:
     * https://github.com/fxb-cocacoding/yara-signator
     * As Malpedia is used as data source, please note that for a given
     * number of families, only single samples are documented.
     * This likely impacts the degree of generalization these rules will offer.
     * Take the described generation method also into consideration when you
     * apply the rules in your use cases and assign them confidence levels.
     */


    strings:
        $sequence_0 = { 732c 837df800 7426 8b45fc 8b4df4 8b1481 89559c }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   732c                 | jae                 0x2e
            //   837df800             | cmp                 dword ptr [ebp - 8], 0
            //   7426                 | je                  0x28
            //   8b45fc               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   8b4df4               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp - 0xc]
            //   8b1481               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ecx + eax*4]
            //   89559c               | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x64], edx

        $sequence_1 = { 89480c 8b55fc 8b451c 894210 694d18a0860100 034d1c }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   89480c               | mov                 dword ptr [eax + 0xc], ecx
            //   8b55fc               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   8b451c               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp + 0x1c]
            //   894210               | mov                 dword ptr [edx + 0x10], eax
            //   694d18a0860100       | imul                ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 0x18], 0x186a0
            //   034d1c               | add                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 0x1c]

        $sequence_2 = { eb07 c745d000000000 8b4508 8a4dd0 888845000100 }
            // n = 5, score = 100
            //   eb07                 | jmp                 9
            //   c745d000000000       | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x30], 0
            //   8b4508               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp + 8]
            //   8a4dd0               | mov                 cl, byte ptr [ebp - 0x30]
            //   888845000100         | mov                 byte ptr [eax + 0x10045], cl

        $sequence_3 = { 8b4d08 e8???????? 8945fc 68???????? 8b4508 50 }
            // n = 6, score = 100
            //   8b4d08               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 8]
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   8945fc               | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 4], eax
            //   68????????           |                     
            //   8b4508               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp + 8]
            //   50                   | push                eax

        $sequence_4 = { 885103 8b45fc 8b4804 8b551c 8b8238000100 894104 8b4dfc }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   885103               | mov                 byte ptr [ecx + 3], dl
            //   8b45fc               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   8b4804               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [eax + 4]
            //   8b551c               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp + 0x1c]
            //   8b8238000100         | mov                 eax, dword ptr [edx + 0x10038]
            //   894104               | mov                 dword ptr [ecx + 4], eax
            //   8b4dfc               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp - 4]

        $sequence_5 = { c1e200 8b45fc 8b4d08 8a1411 885005 b801000000 d1e0 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   c1e200               | shl                 edx, 0
            //   8b45fc               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   8b4d08               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 8]
            //   8a1411               | mov                 dl, byte ptr [ecx + edx]
            //   885005               | mov                 byte ptr [eax + 5], dl
            //   b801000000           | mov                 eax, 1
            //   d1e0                 | shl                 eax, 1

        $sequence_6 = { 8b4df0 51 ff15???????? 85c0 7406 c645ff01 eb04 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   8b4df0               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp - 0x10]
            //   51                   | push                ecx
            //   ff15????????         |                     
            //   85c0                 | test                eax, eax
            //   7406                 | je                  8
            //   c645ff01             | mov                 byte ptr [ebp - 1], 1
            //   eb04                 | jmp                 6

        $sequence_7 = { c6400c00 8b4dfc c641140a 6a04 8b55fc 83c210 52 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   c6400c00             | mov                 byte ptr [eax + 0xc], 0
            //   8b4dfc               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   c641140a             | mov                 byte ptr [ecx + 0x14], 0xa
            //   6a04                 | push                4
            //   8b55fc               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   83c210               | add                 edx, 0x10
            //   52                   | push                edx

        $sequence_8 = { 837df800 742c 8b55fc 8b45f4 8b0c90 898d78ffffff 8b9578ffffff }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   837df800             | cmp                 dword ptr [ebp - 8], 0
            //   742c                 | je                  0x2e
            //   8b55fc               | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   8b45f4               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 0xc]
            //   8b0c90               | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [eax + edx*4]
            //   898d78ffffff         | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x88], ecx
            //   8b9578ffffff         | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp - 0x88]

        $sequence_9 = { 8b45fc 50 e8???????? 0fb6c8 85c9 7444 68???????? }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   8b45fc               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 4]
            //   50                   | push                eax
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   0fb6c8               | movzx               ecx, al
            //   85c9                 | test                ecx, ecx
            //   7444                 | je                  0x46
            //   68????????           |                     

    condition:
        7 of them and filesize < 100352
}
[TLP:WHITE] win_industroyer2_w0   (20220905 | Industroyer2 malware targeting power grid components.)
// Created by Nozomi Networks Labs

rule win_industroyer2_w0 {
    meta:
        author = "Nozomi Networks Labs"
        name = "Industroyer2"
        description = "Industroyer2 malware targeting power grid components."
        actor = "Sandworm"
        source="https://www.nozominetworks.com/downloads/US/Nozomi-Networks-WP-Industroyer2.pdf"
        hash = "D69665F56DDEF7AD4E71971F06432E59F1510A7194386E5F0E8926AEA7B88E00"

        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.industroyer2"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20220905"
        malpedia_hash = "6ec06c64bcfdbeda64eff021c766b4ce34542b71"
        malpedia_version = "20220905"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-NC-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"
    strings:
        $s1 = "%02d:%lS" wide ascii
        $s2 = "PService_PPD.exe" wide ascii
        $s3 = "D:\\OIK\\DevCounter" wide ascii
        $s4 = "MSTR ->> SLV" fullword wide ascii
        $s5 = "MSTR <<- SLV" fullword wide ascii
        $s6 = "Current operation : %s"
        $s7 = "Switch value: %s"
        $s8 = "Unknown APDU format !!!"
        $s9 = "Length:%u bytes |"
        $s10 = "Sent=x%X | Received=x%X"
        $s11 = "ASDU:%u | OA:%u | IOA:%u |"
        $s12 = "Cause: %s (x%X) | Telegram type: %s (x%X)"

    condition:
        5 of them
}
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