SYMBOLCOMMON_NAMEaka. SYNONYMS
win.sliver (Back to overview)

Sliver

VTCollection    

According to VK9 Seecurity, Sliver is a Command and Control (C2) system made for penetration testers, red teams, and advanced persistent threats. It generates implants (slivers) that can run on virtually every architecture out there, and securely manage these connections through a central server. Sliver supports multiple callback protocols including DNS, TCP, and HTTP(S) to make egress simple, even when those pesky blue teams block your domains. You can even have multiple operators (players) simultaneously commanding your sliver army.

References
2024-11-12Hunt.ioHunt.io
Targeting Innovation: Sliver C2 and Ligolo-ng Used in Operation Aimed at Y Combinator
Sliver
2024-10-30Palo Alto Networks Unit 42Unit 42
Jumpy Pisces Engages in Play Ransomware
Dtrack MimiKatz PLAY Sliver
2024-09-30The DFIR ReportThe DFIR Report
Nitrogen Campaign Drops Sliver and Ends With BlackCat Ransomware
BlackCat Nitrogen Loader Sliver
2024-09-01Hunt.ioHunt.io
Echoes of Stargazer Goblin: Analyzing Shared TTPs from an Open Directory
Sliver
2024-07-09SpamhausSpamhaus Malware Labs
Spamhaus Botnet Threat Update January to June 2024
Coper FluBot Hook Bashlite Mirai FAKEUPDATES AsyncRAT BianLian Cobalt Strike DCRat Havoc NjRAT QakBot Quasar RAT RedLine Stealer Remcos Rhadamanthys RisePro Sliver
2024-07-02SekoiaQuentin Bourgue
Exposing FakeBat loader: distribution methods and adversary infrastructure
BlackCat Royal Ransom EugenLoader Carbanak Cobalt Strike DICELOADER Gozi IcedID Lumma Stealer NetSupportManager RAT Pikabot RedLine Stealer SectopRAT Sliver SmokeLoader Vidar
2024-01-30Cluster25Cluster25
The Bear and The Shell: New Campaign Against Russian Opposition
HTTP-Shell Sliver
2024-01-25JSAC 2024Masafumi Takeda, Tomoya Furukawa
Threat Intelligence of Abused Public Post-Exploitation Frameworks
AsyncRAT DCRat Empire Downloader GRUNT Havoc Koadic Merlin PoshC2 Quasar RAT Sliver
2024-01-12SpamhausSpamhaus Malware Labs
Spamhaus Botnet Threat Update Q4 2023
FluBot Hook FAKEUPDATES AsyncRAT BianLian Cobalt Strike DCRat Havoc IcedID Lumma Stealer Meterpreter NjRAT Pikabot QakBot Quasar RAT RecordBreaker RedLine Stealer Remcos Rhadamanthys Sliver
2023-10-12SpamhausSpamhaus Malware Labs
Spamhaus Botnet Threat Update Q3 2023
FluBot AsyncRAT Ave Maria Cobalt Strike DCRat Havoc IcedID ISFB Nanocore RAT NjRAT QakBot Quasar RAT RecordBreaker RedLine Stealer Remcos Rhadamanthys Sliver Stealc Tofsee Vidar
2023-09-11AhnLabSanseo
BlueShell Used in APT Attacks Against Korean and Thai Targets
BlueShell Sliver Dalbit
2023-08-01AhnLabASEC
Sliver C2 Being Distributed Through Korean Program Development Company
Sliver
2023-07-11SpamhausSpamhaus Malware Labs
Spamhaus Botnet Threat Update Q2 2023
Hydra AsyncRAT Aurora Stealer Ave Maria BumbleBee Cobalt Strike DCRat Havoc IcedID ISFB NjRAT QakBot Quasar RAT RecordBreaker RedLine Stealer Remcos Rhadamanthys Sliver Tofsee
2023-06-08VMRayPatrick Staubmann
Busy Bees - The Transformation of BumbleBee
BumbleBee Cobalt Strike Conti Meterpreter Sliver
2023-06-08Twitter (@embee_research)Embee_research
Practical Queries for Identifying Malware Infrastructure: An informal page for storing Censys/Shodan queries
Amadey AsyncRAT Cobalt Strike QakBot Quasar RAT Sliver solarmarker
2023-04-24Immersive LabsKevin Breen
Detecting and decrypting Sliver C2 – a threat hunter’s guide
Sliver
2023-04-12SpamhausSpamhaus Malware Labs
Spamhaus Botnet Threat Update Q1 2023
FluBot Amadey AsyncRAT Aurora Ave Maria BumbleBee Cobalt Strike DCRat Emotet IcedID ISFB NjRAT QakBot RecordBreaker RedLine Stealer Remcos Rhadamanthys Sliver Tofsee Vidar
2023-02-06AhnLabASEC
Sliver Malware With BYOVD Distributed Through Sunlogin Vulnerability Exploitations
Sliver
2022-11-03Github (chronicle)Chronicle
GCTI Open Source Detection Signatures
Cobalt Strike Sliver
2022-10-03Check PointMarc Salinas Fernandez
Bumblebee: increasing its capacity and evolving its TTPs
BumbleBee Cobalt Strike Meterpreter Sliver Vidar
2022-09-01Medium michaelkoczwaraMichael Koczwara
Hunting C2/Adversaries Infrastructure with Shodan and Censys
Brute Ratel C4 Cobalt Strike Deimos GRUNT IcedID Merlin Meterpreter Nighthawk PoshC2 Sliver
2022-08-24MicrosoftMicrosoft Security Experts
Looking for the ‘Sliver’ lining: Hunting for emerging command-and-control frameworks
BumbleBee Sliver
2022-06-15VolexitySteven Adair, Thomas Lancaster, Volexity Threat Research
DriftingCloud: Zero-Day Sophos Firewall Exploitation and an Insidious Breach
pupy Sliver DriftingCloud
2022-05-12Intel 471Intel 471
What malware to look for if you want to prevent a ransomware attack
Conti BumbleBee Cobalt Strike IcedID Sliver
2022-04-29Team CymruJoshua Picolet
Sliver Case Study: Assessing Common Offensive Security Tools The Use of the Sliver C2 Framework for Malicious Purposes
Sliver
2021-12-07TelsyTelsy Research Team
NOBELIUM again or eCrime operation?
Sliver
2021-05-07NCSC UKNCSC UK
Further TTPs associated with SVR cyber actors
Sliver
2019-01-17Github (BishopFox)BishopFox
Sliver Implant Framework
Sliver
Yara Rules
[TLP:WHITE] win_sliver_auto (20201014 | autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator)
rule win_sliver_auto {

    meta:
        author = "Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com"
        date = "2020-10-14"
        version = "1"
        description = "autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator"
        tool = "yara-signator v0.5.0"
        signator_config = "callsandjumps;datarefs;binvalue"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.sliver"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20201014"
        malpedia_hash = "a7e3bd57eaf12bf3ea29a863c041091ba3af9ac9"
        malpedia_version = "20201014"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"

    /* DISCLAIMER
     * The strings used in this rule have been automatically selected from the
     * disassembly of memory dumps and unpacked files, using YARA-Signator.
     * The code and documentation is published here:
     * https://github.com/fxb-cocacoding/yara-signator
     * As Malpedia is used as data source, please note that for a given
     * number of families, only single samples are documented.
     * This likely impacts the degree of generalization these rules will offer.
     * Take the described generation method also into consideration when you
     * apply the rules in your use cases and assign them confidence levels.
     */


    strings:
        $sequence_0 = { c3 488d3d59917900 4889c8 e8???????? ebe5 e8???????? eb80 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   c3                   | dec                 eax
            //   488d3d59917900       | cmp                 edx, esi
            //   4889c8               | jne                 0x9a2
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   ebe5                 | dec                 esp
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   eb80                 | mov                 dword ptr [ecx + 0x30], ecx

        $sequence_1 = { ebd5 31c0 ebd1 31c0 ebcd 750e 4883bc249001000001 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   ebd5                 | mov                 dword ptr [ecx + 0x40], ebp
            //   31c0                 | dec                 ecx
            //   ebd1                 | shl                 ecx, 4
            //   31c0                 | inc                 edi
            //   ebcd                 | mov                 dword ptr [edx + ecx], esp
            //   750e                 | inc                 ebx
            //   4883bc249001000001     | mov    byte ptr [edx + ecx + 4], 0

        $sequence_2 = { 7404 488b4008 0f57c0 0f11842488000000 4889842488000000 488b442458 4889842490000000 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   7404                 | dec                 eax
            //   488b4008             | mov                 dword ptr [esp], ecx
            //   0f57c0               | dec                 eax
            //   0f11842488000000     | lea                 ecx, [esp + 0x28]
            //   4889842488000000     | dec                 eax
            //   488b442458           | mov                 dword ptr [esp + 8], ecx
            //   4889842490000000     | dec                 eax

        $sequence_3 = { eb8f 488b4c2450 488b542448 e9???????? 0fb67310 488d3ddb9c7700 0fb6343e }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   eb8f                 | mov                 eax, dword ptr [eax]
            //   488b4c2450           | dec                 eax
            //   488b542448           | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [eax]
            //   e9????????           |                     
            //   0fb67310             | jbe                 0xe1d
            //   488d3ddb9c7700       | dec                 eax
            //   0fb6343e             | sub                 esp, 0x20

        $sequence_4 = { ebd4 4889442410 90 488d05bf553e00 48890424 e8???????? 488b7c2408 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   ebd4                 | dec                 eax
            //   4889442410           | mov                 dword ptr [esp + 0x90], ebx
            //   90                   | dec                 eax
            //   488d05bf553e00       | mov                 dword ptr [esp + 0x98], edx
            //   48890424             | xorps               xmm0, xmm0
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   488b7c2408           | movups              xmmword ptr [esp + 0xa0], xmm0

        $sequence_5 = { ebea 90 b801000000 488d0d17948600 8701 488b05???????? 48890424 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   ebea                 | mov                 dword ptr [esp], ecx
            //   90                   | mov                 byte ptr [esp + 8], al
            //   b801000000           | jge                 0x8a5
            //   488d0d17948600       | nop                 
            //   8701                 | dec                 eax
            //   488b05????????       |                     
            //   48890424             | mov                 eax, dword ptr [esp + 0xa8]

        $sequence_6 = { ebae 48894c2458 48895c2448 4889442440 488d050b972300 48890424 4c89442408 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   ebae                 | sub                 esp, 0x30
            //   48894c2458           | dec                 eax
            //   48895c2448           | mov                 dword ptr [esp + 0x28], ebp
            //   4889442440           | dec                 eax
            //   488d050b972300       | lea                 ebp, [esp + 0x28]
            //   48890424             | nop                 
            //   4c89442408           | dec                 eax

        $sequence_7 = { ebd1 90 488d05f9140d00 48890424 e8???????? 488b7c2408 48c747084a000000 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   ebd1                 | dec                 eax
            //   90                   | lea                 eax, [0xaba16]
            //   488d05f9140d00       | ja                  0xd5c
            //   48890424             | dec                 ebp
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   488b7c2408           | lea                 ebx, [edx + 1]
            //   48c747084a000000     | dec                 esp

        $sequence_8 = { eb94 4883f80c 750d 488b8c2468010000 488b01 eb81 90 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   eb94                 | lea                 eax, [0x357e0a]
            //   4883f80c             | jbe                 0x14a7
            //   750d                 | dec                 eax
            //   488b8c2468010000     | sub                 esp, 0x20
            //   488b01               | dec                 eax
            //   eb81                 | mov                 dword ptr [esp + 0x18], ebp
            //   90                   | dec                 eax

        $sequence_9 = { e9???????? 65488b0c2528000000 488b8900000000 483b6110 0f86ca000000 4883ec50 48896c2448 }
            // n = 7, score = 100
            //   e9????????           |                     
            //   65488b0c2528000000     | dec    eax
            //   488b8900000000       | lea                 ecx, [0x26bbfa]
            //   483b6110             | dec                 eax
            //   0f86ca000000         | mov                 edx, dword ptr [esp + 0x168]
            //   4883ec50             | dec                 eax
            //   48896c2448           | mov                 dword ptr [edx], ecx

    condition:
        7 of them and filesize < 18211840
}
[TLP:WHITE] win_sliver_w0   (20221012 | Detects Sliver implant cross-platform adversary emulation/red team)
rule win_sliver_w0 {
    meta:
        author = "ditekSHen"
        description = "Detects Sliver implant cross-platform adversary emulation/red team"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.sliver"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20221011"
        malpedia_hash = ""
        malpedia_version = "20221012"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"
    strings:
        $x1 = "github.com/bishopfox/sliver/protobuf/sliverpbb." ascii
        $s1 = ".commonpb.ResponseR" ascii
        $s2 = ".PortfwdProtocol" ascii
        $s3 = ".WGTCPForwarder" ascii
        $s4 = ".WGSocksServerR" ascii
        $s5 = ".PivotEntryR" ascii
        $s6 = ".BackdoorReq" ascii
        $s7 = ".ProcessDumpReq" ascii
        $s8 = ".InvokeSpawnDllReq" ascii
        $s9 = ".SpawnDll" ascii
        $s10 = ".TCPPivotReq" ascii
    condition:
        (uint16(0) == 0x5a4d or uint16(0) == 0x457f or uint16(0) == 0xfacf) and (1 of ($x*) or 5 of ($s*))
}
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