SYMBOLCOMMON_NAMEaka. SYNONYMS
win.grateful_pos (Back to overview)

Grateful POS

aka: FrameworkPOS, SCRAPMINT, trinity

Actor(s): Skeleton Spider, FIN6

VTCollection    

POS malware targets systems that run physical point-of-sale device and operates by inspecting the process memory for data that matches the structure of credit card data (Track1 and Track2 data), such as the account number, expiration date, and other information stored on a card’s magnetic stripe. After the cards are first scanned, the personal account number (PAN) and accompanying data sit in the point-of-sale system’s memory unencrypted while the system determines where to send it for authorization.
Masked as the LogMein software, the GratefulPOS malware appears to have emerged during the fall 2017 shopping season with low detection ratio according to some of the earliest detections displayed on VirusTotal. The first sample was upload in November 2017. Additionally, this malware appears to be related to the Framework POS malware, which was linked to some of the high-profile merchant breaches in the past.

References
2021-01-01 ⋅ Secureworks ⋅ SecureWorks
Threat Profile: GOLD FRANKLIN
Grateful POS Meterpreter MimiKatz RemCom FIN6
2020-03-03 ⋅ PWC UK ⋅ PWC UK
Cyber Threats 2019:A Year in Retrospect
KevDroid MESSAGETAP magecart AndroMut Cobalt Strike CobInt Crimson RAT DNSpionage Dridex Dtrack Emotet FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace FriedEx Gandcrab Get2 GlobeImposter Grateful POS ISFB Kazuar LockerGoga Nokki QakBot Ramnit REvil Rifdoor RokRAT Ryuk shadowhammer ShadowPad Shifu Skipper StoneDrill Stuxnet TrickBot Winnti ZeroCleare APT41 MUSTANG PANDA Sea Turtle
2020-02-19 ⋅ FireEye ⋅ FireEye
M-Trends 2020
Cobalt Strike Grateful POS LockerGoga QakBot TrickBot
2020-02-13 ⋅ Qianxin ⋅ Qi Anxin Threat Intelligence Center
APT Report 2019
Chrysaor Exodus Dacls VPNFilter DNSRat Griffon KopiLuwak More_eggs SQLRat AppleJeus BONDUPDATER Agent.BTZ Anchor AndroMut AppleJeus BOOSTWRITE Brambul Carbanak Cobalt Strike Dacls DistTrack DNSpionage Dtrack ELECTRICFISH FlawedAmmyy FlawedGrace Get2 Grateful POS HOPLIGHT Imminent Monitor RAT jason Joanap KerrDown KEYMARBLE Lambert LightNeuron LoJax MiniDuke PolyglotDuke PowerRatankba Rising Sun SDBbot ServHelper Snatch Stuxnet TinyMet tRat TrickBot Volgmer X-Agent Zebrocy
2019-12-23 ⋅ Norfolk
POS Malware Used at Fuel Pumps
Grateful POS
2019-12-01 ⋅ VISA ⋅ Visa Security Alert
Cybercrime Groups (FIN8) Targeting Fuel Dispenser Merchants
Grateful POS
2019-05-01 ⋅ Red Canary ⋅ Tony Lambert
FrameworkPOS and the adequate persistent threat
Grateful POS
2017-12-13 ⋅ Vitali Kremez Blog ⋅ Vitali Kremez
Update: Let's Learn: Reversing FIN6 "GratefulPOS" aka "FrameworkPOS" Point-of-Sale Malware in-Depth
Grateful POS
2017-12-08 ⋅ RSA ⋅ Kent Beckman
GratefulPOS credit card stealing malware - just in time for the shopping season
Grateful POS
2016-04-01 ⋅ FireEye ⋅ FireEye
Follow the Money: Dissecting the Operations of the Cyber Crime Group FIN6
Grateful POS FIN6
Yara Rules
[TLP:WHITE] win_grateful_pos_auto (20241030 | Detects win.grateful_pos.)
rule win_grateful_pos_auto {

    meta:
        author = "Felix Bilstein - yara-signator at cocacoding dot com"
        date = "2024-10-31"
        version = "1"
        description = "Detects win.grateful_pos."
        info = "autogenerated rule brought to you by yara-signator"
        tool = "yara-signator v0.6.0"
        signator_config = "callsandjumps;datarefs;binvalue"
        malpedia_reference = "https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.grateful_pos"
        malpedia_rule_date = "20241030"
        malpedia_hash = "26e26953c49c8efafbf72a38076855d578e0a2e4"
        malpedia_version = "20241030"
        malpedia_license = "CC BY-SA 4.0"
        malpedia_sharing = "TLP:WHITE"

    /* DISCLAIMER
     * The strings used in this rule have been automatically selected from the
     * disassembly of memory dumps and unpacked files, using YARA-Signator.
     * The code and documentation is published here:
     * https://github.com/fxb-cocacoding/yara-signator
     * As Malpedia is used as data source, please note that for a given
     * number of families, only single samples are documented.
     * This likely impacts the degree of generalization these rules will offer.
     * Take the described generation method also into consideration when you
     * apply the rules in your use cases and assign them confidence levels.
     */


    strings:
        $sequence_0 = { 7407 b8f6ffffff eb02 33c0 }
            // n = 4, score = 600
            //   7407                 | je                  9
            //   b8f6ffffff           | mov                 eax, 0xfffffff6
            //   eb02                 | jmp                 4
            //   33c0                 | xor                 eax, eax

        $sequence_1 = { 7411 e8???????? e8???????? 33c0 e9???????? }
            // n = 5, score = 600
            //   7411                 | je                  0x13
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   33c0                 | xor                 eax, eax
            //   e9????????           |                     

        $sequence_2 = { b8feffffff eb1a b8fdffffff eb13 b8fcffffff }
            // n = 5, score = 600
            //   b8feffffff           | mov                 eax, 0xfffffffe
            //   eb1a                 | jmp                 0x1c
            //   b8fdffffff           | mov                 eax, 0xfffffffd
            //   eb13                 | jmp                 0x15
            //   b8fcffffff           | mov                 eax, 0xfffffffc

        $sequence_3 = { e8???????? 99 b980ee3600 f7f9 }
            // n = 4, score = 600
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   99                   | cdq                 
            //   b980ee3600           | mov                 ecx, 0x36ee80
            //   f7f9                 | idiv                ecx

        $sequence_4 = { eb07 b8fcffffff eb02 33c0 }
            // n = 4, score = 600
            //   eb07                 | jmp                 9
            //   b8fcffffff           | mov                 eax, 0xfffffffc
            //   eb02                 | jmp                 4
            //   33c0                 | xor                 eax, eax

        $sequence_5 = { 83f801 7510 e8???????? e8???????? }
            // n = 4, score = 600
            //   83f801               | cmp                 eax, 1
            //   7510                 | jne                 0x12
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   e8????????           |                     

        $sequence_6 = { 0f858d000000 833d????????00 745a 6a28 8d9574ffffff }
            // n = 5, score = 500
            //   0f858d000000         | mov                 eax, 0xfffffffd
            //   833d????????00       |                     
            //   745a                 | jmp                 0x1a
            //   6a28                 | mov                 eax, 0xfffffffc
            //   8d9574ffffff         | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ebp + ecx*4 - 0x2c]

        $sequence_7 = { e8???????? 83c40c 8b45fc 8b4d0c 8b510c }
            // n = 5, score = 500
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   83c40c               | mov                 esi, dword ptr [ebp - 0x2000c]
            //   8b45fc               | add                 esi, dword ptr [ebp - 0x20008]
            //   8b4d0c               | shr                 esi, 3
            //   8b510c               | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp + 8]

        $sequence_8 = { e8???????? 83c410 8b85e0fbffff 0385dcfbffff }
            // n = 4, score = 500
            //   e8????????           |                     
            //   83c410               | add                 esp, 0x10
            //   8b85e0fbffff         | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 0x420]
            //   0385dcfbffff         | add                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 0x424]

        $sequence_9 = { 83c408 85c0 0f8451010000 c605????????01 c68572f9ffff00 }
            // n = 5, score = 500
            //   83c408               | add                 esp, 8
            //   85c0                 | test                eax, eax
            //   0f8451010000         | je                  0x157
            //   c605????????01       |                     
            //   c68572f9ffff00       | mov                 byte ptr [ebp - 0x68e], 0

        $sequence_10 = { 8b4dbc 894dcc 8b55d0 8955b4 8b45d0 83e801 }
            // n = 6, score = 500
            //   8b4dbc               | push                0
            //   894dcc               | lea                 edx, [ebp - 0x28b]
            //   8b55d0               | push                edx
            //   8955b4               | push                ecx
            //   8b45d0               | jmp                 0xf
            //   83e801               | add                 eax, 1

        $sequence_11 = { 8bb5f4fffdff 03b5f8fffdff c1ee03 8b4508 8b7810 8b85f4fffdff 0385f8fffdff }
            // n = 7, score = 500
            //   8bb5f4fffdff         | mov                 dword ptr [ebp - 0x48], edx
            //   03b5f8fffdff         | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 0x38]
            //   c1ee03               | add                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 0x48]
            //   8b4508               | jne                 0x93
            //   8b7810               | je                  0x5c
            //   8b85f4fffdff         | push                0x28
            //   0385f8fffdff         | lea                 edx, [ebp - 0x8c]

        $sequence_12 = { 51 c705????????00000000 eb0d a1???????? 83c001 a3???????? 8b4d08 }
            // n = 7, score = 500
            //   51                   | mov                 ecx, dword ptr [ebp + 0xc]
            //   c705????????00000000     |     
            //   eb0d                 | mov                 edx, dword ptr [ecx + 0xc]
            //   a1????????           |                     
            //   83c001               | mov                 byte ptr [ebp - 0x28c], cl
            //   a3????????           |                     
            //   8b4d08               | push                0xff

        $sequence_13 = { 888d74fdffff 68ff000000 6a00 8d9575fdffff 52 }
            // n = 5, score = 500
            //   888d74fdffff         | mov                 edi, dword ptr [eax + 0x10]
            //   68ff000000           | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 0x2000c]
            //   6a00                 | add                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 0x20008]
            //   8d9575fdffff         | add                 esp, 0xc
            //   52                   | mov                 eax, dword ptr [ebp - 4]

        $sequence_14 = { 888424c1000000 b801000000 486bc012 488d0df2cb0100 0fbe0401 83f04d }
            // n = 6, score = 200
            //   888424c1000000       | mov                 byte ptr [esp + 0xc1], al
            //   b801000000           | mov                 eax, 1
            //   486bc012             | dec                 eax
            //   488d0df2cb0100       | imul                eax, eax, 0x12
            //   0fbe0401             | dec                 eax
            //   83f04d               | lea                 ecx, [0x1cbf2]

        $sequence_15 = { 03d0 69d290010000 3bca 7414 488d3db7b5feff 4963e9 448b94af14690300 }
            // n = 7, score = 200
            //   03d0                 | movsx               eax, byte ptr [ecx + eax]
            //   69d290010000         | xor                 eax, 0x4d
            //   3bca                 | add                 edx, eax
            //   7414                 | imul                edx, edx, 0x190
            //   488d3db7b5feff       | cmp                 ecx, edx
            //   4963e9               | je                  0x16
            //   448b94af14690300     | dec                 eax

    condition:
        7 of them and filesize < 3964928
}
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